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ABSTRACT 
 
Risk Analysis and Adaptive Response Planning for Water Distribution Systems 
Contamination Emergency Management. (August 2012) 
Amin Rasekh, B.S., Civil Aviation Technology College; 
M.S., Iran University of Science and Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James K. Brumbelow 
 
 Drinking water distribution systems (WDSs) hold a particularly critical and 
strategic position in preserving public health and industrial growth. Despite the ubiquity 
of this infrastructure, its importance for public health, and increased risk of terrorism, 
several aspects of emergency management for WDSs remain at an undeveloped stage. A 
set of methods is developed to analyze the risk and consequences of WDS contamination 
events and develop emergency response support tools.  
 Monte Carlo and optimization schemes are developed to evaluate contamination 
risk of WDSs for generation of critical contamination scenarios. A multicriteria 
optimization approach is proposed that treats likelihood and consequences as 
independent risk measures to find an ensemble of uniformly-distributed critical 
scenarios. This approach provides insight into system risk and potential mitigation 
options not available under maximum risk or maximum consequences analyses. 
Static multiobjective simulation-optimization schemes are developed for 
generation of optimal response mechanisms for contamination incidents with two 
 iv
conflicting objectives of minimization of health consequences and impacts on non-
consumptive water uses. Performance of contaminant flushing and containment are 
investigated. Pressure-driven hydraulic analysis is performed to simulate the 
complicated system hydraulics under pressure-deficit conditions. 
Performance of a novel preventive response action – injection of food-grade dye 
directly into drinking water – for mitigation of health impacts as a contamination threat 
unfolds is explored. The emergency response is formulated as a multiobjective 
optimization problem for the minimization of risks to life with minimum false warning 
and cost. A multiobjective optimization scheme is used for the management of 
contamination events for diverse contaminant agents without interruption of firefighting. 
A dynamic modeling scheme is developed that accounts for the time-varying 
behavior of the system during an emergency. Effects of actions taken by the managers 
and consumers as well as the changing perceived contaminant source attributes are 
included in the simulation model to provide a realistic picture of the dynamic 
environment. A dynamic optimization scheme is coupled with the simulation model to 
identify and update the optimal response recommendations during the emergency. 
Machine learning approaches are employed for real-time characterization of 
contaminant sources and identification of effective response strategies for a timely and 
effective response to contamination incidents and threats. In contrast to traditional 
approaches that perform whole analysis after a contamination event occurs, proposed 
machine learning methods gain system knowledge in advance and use this extracted 
information to identify contamination attributes after an incident occurs.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1 
Drinking water distribution systems (WDSs) are critical urban infrastructures that 
are vulnerable to contamination because of their ubiquity, multiple points of access, and 
aging infrastructure. Contaminants may be introduced into the system either accidentally 
during a back-flow or cross-connection incident or intentionally through a malevolent 
attack. These systems have been recognized as one of several critical infrastructures that 
are vulnerable to terrorism attacks through the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act (PL 107-188) (U.S. Government Accountability Office 
2004). Accordingly, this research project aims to analyze the risk of WDS contamination 
incidents and develop a comprehensive response planning framework for the emergency 
management of contamination hazard intrusions into water distribution systems. 
Monte Carlo and risk-based optimization schemes are developed to evaluate 
contamination risk of WDSs for generation of critical scenarios that are representative of 
the most vulnerable aspects of the system. Defining attributes of contamination scenarios 
are identified as contaminant type and amount, contamination location, start time, 
duration, and time of year it occurs. Documented waterborne outbreaks reported in 
developed nations are analyzed to empirically estimate statistical characteristics of 
defining attributes in accidental events. Monte Carlo simulation is conducted to 
determine the probability distribution of public health consequences, aggregate 
conditional risk, and significance of different scenario attributes. A multiobjective 
_____________ 
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optimization methodology is proposed to capture the attributes of critical accidental 
contamination scenarios. The principal risk components of likelihood and health 
consequences are treated as optimization objectives and are maximized simultaneously 
to identify an ensemble of non-dominated critical scenarios. The multiobjective 
approach provides insight into system risk and potential mitigation options not available 
under maximum risk or maximum consequences analyses. 
Decisions on protecting public health against possible water contamination 
threats should be made with careful consideration of credibility of threat observations 
and unintended impacts of response implementation on water supply system 
serviceability. Response optimization frameworks are structured to help water utility 
operators in making such critical decisions during the intense course of an emergency. 
Pressure-driven hydraulic analysis is performed to simulate the complicated system 
hydraulics and propagation of a contaminant through water distribution system under 
pressure-deficit conditions due to the execution of response actions. Application of this 
analysis approach relaxes the hard constraint of avoiding negative pressures fundamental 
to demand-driven models which filters out many potentially effective response plans 
from the search space. Response actions of contaminant containment and flushing 
operation rules are optimized for achievement of public health protection with minimal 
service disruption. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to assess optimal response 
performance for varying response delay, number of hydrants, and intrusion 
characteristics. Different methods are explored for quantifying impacts on public health 
and system serviceability and the sensitivity of optimal response plan to these different 
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formulations is investigated. It is concluded that the analysts must be cautious of 
potentially misleading risk reduction recommendations that can be offered due to 
inherent imperfection in quantitative measures of response criteria that are based on 
preset exposure thresholds. 
This study also explores performance of a novel preventive response action – 
injection of food-grade dye directly into drinking water – for mitigation of health 
impacts as a contamination threat unfolds. Dye injection acts as an alerting mechanism 
that discourages public consumption of potentially contaminated water. Considering the 
uncertainties in threat observations and the imperfection in system understanding, 
however, the action has potential for costly false alarms. These could occur when 
contamination has indeed happened but population segments residing in safe regions are 
mistakenly alerted or when observations of contamination occurrence turn out to be 
entirely wrong. The emergency response is thus formulated as a static multiobjective 
optimization problem for the minimization of risks to life with minimum public warning 
and execution cost. 
A dynamic modeling scheme is developed that accounts for the time-varying 
behavior of the system during an emergency. Effects of actions taken by the managers 
and consumers as well as the changing perceived contaminant source attributes are 
included in the simulation model to provide a more realistic picture of the dynamic 
environment. A multiobjective-based dynamic optimization scheme is coupled with the 
adaptive system simulation model to identify and continuously update the optimal 
response recommendations at every stage of the emergency. A major advantage of this 
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technique is that it eliminates the need for defining a priori the proper diversity 
preservation parameter. 
Contamination source identification involves the characterization of the 
contamination event attributes using threat observations such as sensor network 
measurements. The defining attributes of a contamination event may include 
contaminant type, site(s) of contaminant intrusion, contaminant amount, the time of day 
the contamination event is initiated, and the intrusion duration. Accurate and prompt 
determination of these attributes is central to validity of impact assessments conducted 
and effectiveness of response strategies taken. Focusing on high accuracy, past efforts 
have successfully applied optimization and back-tracking approaches to deal with this 
critical task. However, these techniques are typically computationally burdensome and 
thus not acceptably fast, specifically when they are applied to realistically large water 
distribution networks. This study accordingly investigates performance of machine 
learning tools for real-time source identification. In contrast to traditional approaches 
that perform whole analysis after a contamination event occurs, machine learning 
methods gain system knowledge in advance and use this extracted information to 
identify contamination attributes after an incident occurs. Machine learning tools are 
employed to derive emergency response rules from the large set of response 
optimization results which may not be decipherable during the extraordinarily critical 
environment of an emergency. Identification of the trends in most reliable response 
strategies for each trigger event provides an in-depth understanding of the system that 
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the emergency managers can use for making rapid and reliable decisions during a 
contamination events.  
Applicability and performance of all proposed approaches is demonstrated on 
water distribution system of Mesopolis virtual city. With a population of approximately 
150,000, Mesopolis resembles the intricacy and interconnectedness of real world water 
distribution networks that help conducting a more realistic evaluation of the structured 
risk assessment and response planning frameworks. 
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2. RISK ASSESSMENT TO CHARACTERIZE CRITICAL CONTAMINATION 
SCENARIOS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Drinking WDSs are critical urban infrastructures that are expected to deliver safe 
drinking water to consumers with minimal disruption. Accidental contamination of these 
systems has historically been recognized as a threat to public health worldwide (Hrudey 
and Hrudey 2004, 2007). Despite recent technological advances, water contamination 
outbreaks have persisted in developed nations resulting in sickness and mortality 
(Reynolds et al. 2008). Documented outbreaks are primarily the result of inadequate 
knowledge of source water hazards, technological failures, failure to treat water, and 
human error (Craun et al. 2006; Hrudey and Hrudey 2007). Accompanied by the past 
decade’s concerns over terrorism threats, industry attention and research efforts have 
focused on development of vulnerability mitigation and emergency response plans. 
While significant activity has been devoted to terrorism threats based upon hypothetical 
information with no uncertainty estimated, relatively little effort has focused on 
addressing accidental contamination threats using evidence documented by the public 
health community.  This chapter presents a set of methods for assessment of these threats 
that incorporates both likelihood and consequences based on past real contamination 
events. 
The risk assessment process is a set of cogent, well-defined, and systemic 
activities that provide the decisionmaker with a thorough understanding, quantification, 
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and evaluation of the risk associated with certain natural hazard or man-made threat 
(Haimes 2009). It aims to answer the three fundamental questions: 1) What can go 
wrong?, 2) What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?, and 3) If it does occur, what 
are the consequences? (Kaplan and Garrik 1981). Risk-based mitigation processes 
include assessment of event probabilities and impacts and seek measures that 
consciously avoid unintended consequences. Such strategies are suited to policy 
decisions where a limited budget must be allocated among complex options to form a 
defense strategy that minimizes the maximum risk from the actions of an attacker or 
accidents (National Research Council 2008). The Risk Analysis and Management for 
Critical Asset Protection framework (American Society of Mechanical Engineers 2006) 
used by the Department of Homeland Security (Moore et al. 2007) and American Water 
Works Association (Morley 2010) emphasizes the need to consider the worst reasonable 
case scenarios in risk management. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA) Response Protocol Toolbox (RPT) (USEPA 2003) requires preparation of a 
response planning matrix which lists scenarios with different levels of credibility, the 
potential consequences of a threat, and possible response actions along with their 
impacts on consumers. However, the RPT provides no detailed instructions on how these 
scenarios and credibility levels can be identified.  Characterization of critical scenarios is 
thus a necessary initial phase in the overall planning framework for risk mitigation and 
emergency response. It serves as a guide for a water utility by providing a basis for 
protection system design and a consistent criterion for evaluating the adequacy of such a 
design. It can help identify vulnerable system elements and prioritize available resources 
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to assure cost-effective protective measures while ensuring minimal disruption of 
reliable supply of water.  We define a contamination scenario here as encompassing a 
defined set of attributes, resulting in a specific level of health impacts, and having a 
specific probability of occurrence.   
 Several studies have used Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) to estimate the likely 
health impacts from contamination intrusion into WDSs (Uber et al. 2004; Nilsson et al. 
2005; Khanal et al. 2006; Torres et al. 2009; Pasha and Lansey 2010). Khanal et al. 
(2006) also performed a generalized sensitivity analysis to determine sensitivity of WDS 
response to dynamic variables of base demand, storage capacity, injection mass, and 
injection duration. Exposure levels were found to be most sensitive to variations in base 
demand and injection mass. Davis and Janke (2011) conducted a sensitivity 
characterization study that included intrusion duration and contaminant amount for a set 
of actual systems.  Perelman and Ostfeld (2010; in press) proposed a method derived 
from cross entropy for sampling extreme-impact contamination events for the design of 
contamination warning systems.  
 Previous studies have been primarily focused on deliberate intrusions and have 
either ignored the uncertainties in some scenario attributes or constructed hypothetical 
probability distributions to quantify these uncertainties. In addition, while application of 
MCS provides a helpful insight into the variability of exposure levels and significance of 
different scenario attributes given realistic probability distributions are used, it does not 
guarantee that the critical scenarios are efficiently identified. Risk-based assessment, 
which considers both scenario likelihood and consequences (Kaplan and Garrick 1981), 
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is an attractive tool to identify an ensemble of critical contamination scenarios to include 
events ranging from rare extreme-impact scenarios to more likely scenarios associated 
with relatively lower consequences but maximum risk (the product of likelihood and 
consequences).  Additionally, risk mitigation plans can be evaluated and compared by 
relative risk reduction.   
 The remainder of this chapter is thus organized in three major sections. First, 
documented major waterborne outbreaks and real water utility demand information are 
analyzed to determine generally applicable stochastic properties of contamination 
scenario attributes. Second, the use of MCS to evaluate aggregate risk and identify 
relative importance of contamination scenario attributes is discussed and illustrated. 
Third, a risk-based multiobjective optimization methodology is structured to identify a 
set of non-dominated contamination scenarios ranging from extreme-impact scenarios to 
most likely events, and the method is demonstrated.  Finally, the chapter concludes with 
discussion of extensions to these methods.  
  
2.2 Quantification of Uncertainty in Contamination Scenario Attributes  
 A contamination scenario is defined by a set of attributes including: (1) 
contaminant type, (2) site(s) of contaminant intrusion, (3) contaminant amount, (4) time 
of year (which can be represented by the surrogate WDS-wide demand multiplier (DM)), 
(5) the time of day the contamination event is initiated, and (6) the intrusion duration. 
We base our quantification of most of the stochastic properties of these attributes on 
analysis of 70 real accidental water contamination events compiled by Hrudey and 
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Hrudey (2004). All of these events occurred in community water systems in developed 
nations (U.S., Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) during the 
period of 1974-2004. During the almost identical period 1971-2002, Blackburn et al. 
(2004) report slightly less than 300 contamination events in U.S. community systems 
with only about half of those having determined etiology.  Accounting for relative 
population differences and assuming similar rates of contamination occurrence, the 
Hrudey and Hrudey case study set thus represents a significant fraction of worldwide 
contamination events in community systems in developed nations.  The water systems 
and event characteristics in the case study set include a wide range of utility sizes (300 to 
746,000 users), water sources (roughly split evenly between ground and surface water), 
and contamination sources; no significant cross-correlations of event attributes are 
apparent.  Review of the relative roles of technological failure and human error found 
that about 56% of events in the study set included some degree of human error in event 
causation; in about a quarter of events human error was dominant.  Thus, the case study 
set is sufficiently large and wide-ranging for generalizable analysis, and technological 
advances have not rendered the cases moot. 
   
2.2.1 Site of Contaminant Intrusion 
Epidemiological studies often proceed with great sophistication to identify 
contaminant introduction to source waters far removed from the WDS itself (e.g., animal 
sources in raw water reservoirs).  However, from the standpoint of WDS modeling and 
management it is operational failure at a water treatment plant (WTP) that should 
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remove or inactivate contaminants by design, which allows introduction of these 
contaminants to the WDS.  This reality allows a simplified characterization of 
contaminant intrusion site as either “WTP” or “distribution system (DS)”, the latter 
consisting of the WDS pipe network and storage tanks. The analysis finds 89% of 
accidental contamination intrusion sites are at WTPs and 11% are in the DS (9% in DS 
pipes and 2% in DS storage tanks).  
 
2.2.2 Contaminant Type and Amount 
In 65 of the Hrudey and Hrudey (2004) case studies, specific pathogen 
contaminants were identified; none of the events had specified chemical contaminants.  
Five pathogens have been comparatively more frequent and were selected for this 
analysis: Giardia lamblia, E. coli, C. jejuni, Cryptosporidium, and Norwalk-like virus 
(NLV). Occurrence probabilities for these five contaminants were calculated by 
frequency of occurrence in the data set (Table 2.1). 
Amount of introduced contaminant (measured here as the number of infective 
doses per capita [IDPC]) was inferred for each event by the following backward 
procedure. The number of reported disease cases was first multiplied by the ratio of 
water use per capita to tap water intake to estimate the number of doses for each 
outbreak. This number was then normalized by population served by the WDS. Expected 
value of number of doses (E[IDPC]) for each specific pathogen is finally calculated via 
averaging normalized  number of doses for all outbreaks associated with that pathogen.  
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Uncertainties in IDPC for other systems can be modeled using the exponential 
distribution with cumulative distribution function (CDF): 
 
 CDF( ) 1 expIDPC IDPC     (2.1)
 
where  = the reciprocal of the expected value of IDPC (1/E[IDPC]).  Values of 
E[IDPC] for each pathogen are given in Table 2.1. Testing of the exponential 
distribution for the five pathogen samples using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows 
acceptance of the derived exponential distributions at the 20% significance level in 4 
cases (see Fig. 2.1 for examples). Cryptosporidium cases were not well modeled by the 
exponential distribution because they tended toward extremes of apparent IDPC values; 
Table 2.1. Statistical data for pathogens 
Pathogen type 
Occurrence probability 
(%) 
E[IDPC] 
Giardia 20.6 195 
E. coli 15.9 131 
C. jejuni 20.6 197 
Norwalk-like 
virus 
15.9 239 
Cryptosporidium 27.0 
IDPC quartiles: min 0.29, 25%: 1.0, 
med. 2.3, 75%: 87, max 412  
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this phenomenon is likely a consequence of the organism’s unique properties for 
morbidity and resilience in the environment (including chlorine-resistance). Table 2.1 
includes quartile values of IDPC for Cryptosporidium rather than E[IDPC]. 
 This study count a person as sick when the ingested contaminant dose exceeds 
the infectious does no matter how much. In other words, health impacts for two  exposed 
persons is treated equally when the ingested mass in above infectious dose disregarding 
the fact that one may have might have significantly ingested more contaminant. To 
provide a more realistic picture of the problem, on may quantify the amount of 
contaminant as the number of lethal doses introduced into the system during a 
contamination event too. This, however, is not feasible to be performed with acceptable 
level of accuracy since the number of occurred contamination events resulting in deaths 
is highly scarce. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. Probability distribution model for contaminant amount 
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2.2.3 Time of Year 
Aggregate water demand for a WDS typically varies throughout the year with 
minimum demand in the winter and maximum demand in the summer.  These varying 
demands result in two important effects for contamination events: (1) differing flow 
velocities and contaminant transport rates, and (2) differing ratios of consumed to non-
consumed water at consumer nodes.  Data on water use in New York City for 1982 
(Protopapas et al. 2000) is used here to identify an appropriate probability distribution 
function (PDF) for a WDS aggregate demand multiplier, which is used as a surrogate for 
time of year. The chi-squared goodness-of-fit test was performed on a candidate set of 
distribution functions (Normal, Log-normal, Gamma, and Beta functions) to model 
uncertainty in the demand multiplier and the shifted Gamma PDF was found to be the 
best-fit distribution function. This probability density function (PDF) is expressed as: 
 



 
)(
1)(
)(
1)(

DM
eDMDMPDF  (2.2)
 
where , , and  = distribution parameters. Fig. 2.2 illustrates the empirical data and 
best-fit distribution. Similar assessments for an unpublished, confidential dataset 
provided by a Texas water utility indicated the suitability of the shifted Gamma 
distribution.  However, the Texas dataset exhibited significantly greater variation than 
the New York City case. The New York demand multipliers ranged from 0.9 to 1.4, and 
the Texas multipliers ranged from 0.5 to 2.0, which is to be expected as summer 
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demands include much higher landscape irrigation in the Texas dataset.  Thus, a specific 
utility would need to analyze its own aggregate demand data to determine appropriate 
Gamma distribution parameters. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Probability distribution model for WDS-wide demand multiplier 
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(a.k.a. “water age”) as a practicable upper bound for modeling of intrusion duration.  
Contaminant intrusions lasting longer than this upper bound will lead to linearly 
increasing exposures of consumers to contaminant, but no further dynamic phenomena 
remain to be discovered once contaminant has been allowed to reach a maximum spatial 
extent.  As technology to diagnose potential contamination events in real-time improves 
(e.g., Hart et al. 2009), it is hoped that shorter intrusion durations would be most 
relevant. Owing to the long contaminant intrusion durations often experienced in actual 
events, time of contaminant initiation has practically no documentation for these events.  
However, diurnal flow variations could very well lead to exposure sensitivity to time of 
initiation, especially for very short intrusion durations (i.e., less than 24 hours).  At this 
time, simple uniform distributions of these parameters are perhaps the best possibilities, 
but we include them in the framework as possibly discernible and important attributes in 
the future. 
 
2.3 Propagation of Uncertainties, Aggregate Conditional Risk, and Sensitivity to 
Attributes  
2.3.1 Monte Carlo Simulation 
To determine the general effects of uncertainty in the attributes defined above on 
a WDS’s risk circumstances, Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is an effective tool. MCS is 
a numerical procedure designed to propagate the uncertainties in system input random 
variables to determine the uncertainty properties of system outputs by performing a large 
number of simulations sampling from the appropriate distribution for each input 
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variable. For accidental water contamination threats, the scenario defining attributes 
described above are the stochastic input parameters, and system response is consumer 
exposure.  The statistical analysis of scenario attributes presented above thus facilitates 
the stochastic realizations.  
As will be shown in the application example below, MCS for accidental 
contamination scenarios produces system response (i.e., consumer exposures) with high 
variance.  This numerical product necessitates relatively large numbers of MCS 
simulations in order to produce reasonable belief intervals on distributions of system 
outputs (Morgan and Henrion 1990).  However, the large number of realizations does 
provide a usefully large sample by which to assess sensitivity of exposure numbers to 
individual scenario attributes.  Likewise, the MCS analysis allows determination of an 
empirical distribution function of exposure, which can provide significant understanding 
of aggregate WDS risk and allow for comparative analysis of potential mitigation 
options. 
 
2.3.2 Application Example 
Adverse health impacts are calculated using the EPANET simulator (Rossman 
2000) coupled with an exposure model. Simulation is performed under extended 
conditions to account for the dynamics of the system and temporal variations of water 
demand. In our example the contamination transport is simulated as a perfect tracer: 
density effects, decay, and reaction with wall materials and other dissolved species are 
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not considered; these effects could be added to the simulation using EPANET’s water 
quality routines if reliable information on these phenomena is available. 
The quantity of contaminant ingested by individuals during a contamination 
event depends on water ingestion patterns and time-varying concentration of 
contaminant. The timing ingestion model selected for this study assumes that tap water 
is ingested at the common starting times for the three major meals (7:00, 12:00, and 
18:00) and times halfway between these meals (9:30 and 15:00). Daily per capita tap 
water intake rate was set to 0.93 L/day based upon USEPA (2004). Alterations in water 
demands after the contamination event unfolds are not considered in this study. 
For illustration we will use the virtual city and WDS “Mesopolis” (Johnston and 
Brumbelow 2008), an open-source virtual city that is developed in both geographic 
information systems and EPANET (Fig. 2.3) and possesses spatial and temporal features 
of complex real world WDSs. The WDS is comprised of 2,062 water mains, 876 
hydrants, 65 pumps, two treatment plants, one reservoir, and 13 tanks. Demands are 
exerted at 706 residential, industrial, and commercial/institutional nodes, representing a 
mid-size community of approximately 147,000 residents. Parameters of the shifted 
Gamma distribution for demand multiplier are 7.3 , 18.0  and 5.0 . The 
continuous random variable values are discretized to form a probability mass function to 
simplify MCS trials. A uniform probability mass function with one-hour intervals from 
one to four days is assumed here for the duration of contaminant intrusion. The time of 
day a contamination event is initiated is uniformly distributed throughout the day with 
one-hour intervals. Since the analysis of past events showed that 89% of accidental 
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events have intrusion at treatment facilities, only the WTPs are considered as possible 
intrusion locations, as this high probability for WTPs will dominate risk over any 
particular distribution system location. Contaminant amount follows the exponential 
distribution defined by the expected values that are estimated through scaling statistical 
analysis results to the population of Mesopolis (Table 2.1). 
To estimate the uncertainty in human exposure and the significance of different 
scenario attributes 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations were performed. Exceedance 
probability (i.e., 1-CDF) curves for exposure above infective dose (ID) are depicted in 
Fig. 2.4. This figure also illustrates the curves for each WTP that are constructed using 
only the realizations associated with each plant. It is observed that almost 76% of all 
realizations result in zero exposure, meaning the total ingested contaminant amount for 
no person exceeds ID. This percentage is smaller for the realizations associated with the 
 
Fig. 2.3. Water distribution system of Mesopolis 
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West WTP (65%) while it is noticeably larger when contamination occurs in the East 
WTP (91%). Although the occurrence probability of non-zero exposure contamination 
events is much smaller for the East WTP, severity of extreme-impact scenarios is 
considerably greater for this WTP. Exposure never exceeds 38,000 if the contamination 
occurs in the West WTP while it may exceed 120,000 for the East WTP. This result is 
rooted in system hydraulics. While the hydraulics change with time and variations in 
total municipal demand, the West WTP supplies water only to the consumers in the 
western region. However, the East WTP supplies water to a much larger area covering 
almost the whole city. Accordingly, if the contamination occurs in the West WTP, it 
only affects the hydraulically isolated western region with approximate population of 
38,000 while nearly the whole city population is at risk if the East WTP is the source. 
Dilution of the contaminant plume, however, is much more significant for East WTP 
because the contaminated area is larger, and this lowers the probability that ingested 
mass of contaminant exceeds ID and causes sickness.  
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Exceedance probability curves for human exposure 
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To determine overall risk for the system, the area under an exceedance 
probability curve may be integrated to produce Aggregate Conditional Risk (ACR) – the 
expected value of consequences over all foreseeable possible events conditioned on the 
occurrence of a single event.  ACR is a convenient summary statistic of a WDS’s 
circumstances, and comparisons of ACR values for differing assumptions or potential 
mitigation plans provide insight for relative conditions.  For the Mesopolis example, 
ACR values for the East and West WTPs are, respectively, 5260 and 10800 exposures 
above ID.  Thus, from a risk-management perspective (where risk is the product of 
likelihood and consequences), the West WTP is the element of higher priority even 
though the East WTP could experience higher consequence events.  Various risk-
mitigation plans could then be evaluated by their benefits in ACR reduction versus cost 
of implementation.  It is possible that a decision maker may be more concerned with 
extreme events (e.g., Perelman and Ostfeld 2010; in press), and the exceedance 
probability curves also provide useful information for that reasoning where the East 
WTP would be of greatest concern. 
Relative effects of variability in contamination scenario attributes on average 
exposure number above ID are illustrated in Fig. 2.5 for contaminant type, demand 
multiplier, intrusion start time, and intrusion duration. NLV and Cryptosporidium are 
associated with maximum and minimum averaged exposures, respectively, for both 
WTPs. However, Cryptosporidium has about twice the occurrence probability of NLV 
(Table 2.1), which underscores the interplay among the attribute uncertainty structures. 
In general, exposure follows a decreasing pattern with increasing demand multiplier, a 
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consequence of higher demands forcing contaminant through the WDS faster and 
decreasing residence time (and exposure opportunities) and higher flows diluting 
contaminant concentrations. Although the results demonstrate fluctuations in exposure 
as start time and duration respectively change, no consistent pattern is apparent.  Thus, a 
picture of particular vulnerabilities and their relative levels of importance emerges. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5. Variability in exposure due to varying scenario attributes 
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2.4 Identifying Ensembles of Critical Scenarios 
2.4.1 Methodology 
While the above methods diagnose general risk circumstances for a WDS, 
vulnerability mitigation planning typically requires identification of some ensemble of 
critical scenarios (a.k.a. “design basis threats,” e.g., Van Leuven 2011).  This ensemble 
constitutes a focused and finite range of scenarios against which to plan, making the 
process practicable.  We apply here mathematical optimization to identify ensembles of 
critical accidental contamination scenarios using 2 selection criteria – maximum risk and 
maximum consequences – with full development of the tradeoff relationship between 
likelihood and consequences. Kanta and Brumbelow (2012) have applied a similar risk-
based optimization method to the identification of WDS fire-flow vulnerabilities. In the 
universe of possible events, managers and decision makers are most concerned about 
occurrence of the events that are associated with both high consequences and likelihood. 
A conventional approach is to aggregate probability and adverse effects to estimate the 
single criterion of risk that provides a measure for ranking events. We will deviate 
slightly from this single-objective approach for a few reasons.  First, as noted above, 
decision makers are at times very concerned with maximum consequence scenarios and 
willing to downplay to some extent likelihood.  Second, diversity in the critical scenario 
ensemble is expected to encourage robustness in risk-mitigation planning.  Third, 
explicit quantification of the tradeoff relationship between likelihood and consequences 
can generate insight into vulnerability and potential mitigation options.  
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In contrast to a single-objective approach that searches for a single solution with 
the maximum product of likelihood and consequence, the multiobjective optimization 
approach proposed here seeks a set of critical events considering probability and 
exposure as independent risk components (i.e., 2 independent optimization objectives). 
The term “maximum-risk frontier” is coined here to describe the set of non-dominated 
scenarios in these objectives. Based on the general concept of dominance in 
multiobjective optimization (Deb 2001), scenario x1 dominates x2 if two conditions are 
met: 1) the respective magnitudes of x1’s likelihood and consequences are each greater 
than or equal to those for x2, and 2) the value of at least one of these two risk 
components is greater for x1. A scenario is defined as non-dominated if there is no 
scenario in the whole universe of possible scenarios which dominates it. A set of such 
non-dominated scenarios subsequently construct a maximum-risk frontier. 
Occurrence probability of each scenario can be described with the joint 
probability mass function of the random scenario attributes (Ang and Tang 2007): 
 
 tTtTlLdmDMmMcCPp  ,,,,, (2.3)
 
where C = pathogen type, M = contaminant amount, DM = water demand multiplier, L
= contamination location, T = time of day contamination event is initiated, and T = 
intrusion duration are the scenario attributes.  Statistical independence is assumed among 
all scenario attributes except contaminant type and amount.  The probabilistic properties 
of the attributes can be taken from the analysis above. While all six attributes could be 
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defined as decision variables, a reduced set of four continuous decision variables – 
contaminant amount, demand multiplier, initiation time, and duration of intrusion – will 
be used here to reduce computational burden and avoid discontinuities associated with 
the discrete variables – contaminant type and intrusion location.  Multiple optimization 
runs are performed with fixed values of the discrete variables, which also allows for 
sensitivity analysis to be conducted. This procedure also sidesteps the issue of differing 
severity of illness associated with different pathogens. 
 
2.4.2 Optimization Algorithm 
The event simulation model described above coupled with the multiple 
independent probability structures of the decision variables suggests that the 
optimization problem involves both significant nonlinearities and a high potential for 
multi-modality. Genetic algorithms (GA) have proven to be flexible and effective tools 
in solving such complex water resources problems (Nicklow et al. 2010). GAs are 
discussed fully by Deb (2001), but the basic issues in any GA are: (1) representation of 
decision variable sets as “chromosomes,” (2) evaluation of chromosomes through fitness 
functions, (3) recombination of discrete decisions among sets through a crossover 
operator, and (4) random perturbation of decision sets through a mutation operator. GAs 
have been extensively employed for optimal design of WDSs as evidenced by use of GA 
for sizing of pipes (Krapivka and Ostfeld 2009), placement of early warning sensors 
(Ostfeld and Salmons 2004), and contamination consequence management (Baranowski 
and LeBoeuf 2008).  
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GAs have demonstrated unique ways of handling multiobjective optimization 
problems. Since they are population-based optimization methods, they offer a means of 
finding the Pareto optimal front in a single run. Over the past decade, several 
multiobjective evolutionary algorithms have been proposed (Guliashki et al. 2009). Non-
dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) is arguably the 
most popular among existing algorithms available and has been widely employed for 
multiobjective design and operation of WDSs (Preis and Ostfeld 2008; Alfonso et al. 
2010). NSGA-II is an elitist optimization algorithm which uses a fast non-dominated 
sorting strategy and does not require any user-defined parameter for diversity 
preservation. The NSGA-II algorithm employed here uses the simulated binary 
crossover (SBX) operator (Deb and Agrawal 1995) and polynomial mutation (Deb 2001) 
to create offspring population. 
 
2.4.3 Application Example 
The multiobjective optimization scheme is applied to find the maximum-risk 
frontiers for all possible combinations of pathogens and WTPs. Tuning of the GA 
optimization parameters was performed through a series of sensitivity analyses, and the 
final values are reported in Table 2.2. For clarity, we show the frontiers found for two 
pathogens, Giardia and E. coli, in Fig. 2.6. For exposures below 38,000, scenarios 
associated with the West WTP are more critical than at the East WTP as they are 
noticeably more probable for the same exposure level. Contamination scenarios with an 
exposure above 38,000, however, may only happen if they occur at the East WTP, which 
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is in agreement with the MCS results. In other words, all non-dominated scenarios 
associated with the East WTP with exposure below 38,000 are dominated by non-
dominated scenarios for the West WTP. From a system-wide perspective, thus, the 
maximum-risk frontier may be split into a high-likelihood and low-severity partition 
associated with the West WTP and a low-likelihood and high-severity section 
corresponding to the East WTP. Obtained maximum-risk frontiers could serve as a 
suitable criterion for assessing efficacy of mitigation policies; a more effective strategy 
is the one that moves these frontiers more towards the origin. 
 
Table 2.2. NSGA-II algorithm parameters 
Optimization parameter  Value 
Population size 100 
Number of generations 150 
Tournament size 3 
Crossover probability 0.80 
Mutation probability 0.05 
SBX crossover distribution 
index 
15 
Polynomial mutation 
distribution index 
10 
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As mentioned above, a single-objective approach optimizing risk (the product of 
likelihood and consequences) would be a more traditional risk-management technique. 
The multiobjective approach explicitly contains the scenarios that would be found in the 
single-objective method. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.7 that shows the product measure 
versus exposure for all obtained non-dominated scenarios for Giardia.  The “peak” in 
each ensemble is the scenario having maximum risk according to the traditional product 
definition. However, the multi-objective approach allows for greater insight on the 
relative properties of scenarios and potential mitigation plans when weighing maximum 
risk versus maximum consequence decision possibilities.  This idea is illustrated 
schematically in Fig. 2.8.  A typical maximum-risk frontier is shown by black squares 
with the maximum risk ensemble bounded by an ellipse and the maximum-consequence 
ensemble bounded by a rectangle. Risk frontiers for two potential mitigation plans are 
also shown with their respective maximum risk and maximum consequence ensembles 
 
Fig. 2.6. Maximum-risk frontier for different pathogens and treatment plants 
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similarly bounded.  This drawing demonstrates the concept of two plans improving over 
the original system but having differing advantages relative to each other: one minimizes 
maximum product, and one minimizes maximum consequences.  A single-objective 
approach focused on either criterion would not produce this insight; it is only possible 
using this type of multiobjective technique. 
 
 
Fig. 2.7. Product risk measure associated with non-dominated contamination 
scenarios versus corresponding exposure for the Giardia pathogen 
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Sensitivity of results is shown for the decision space in Fig. 2.9 with contaminant 
amount and demand multiplier associated with maximum-risk frontier solutions for 
Giardia. For the most part, the results are not surprising. Greater contaminant amount 
leads to more exposures for both WTPs, and exposures decrease with demand multiplier 
for the West WTP as shown in the MCS results (Fig. 2.5(b)).  However, the relationship 
between demand multiplier and exposure is more complicated for the East WTP non-
dominated scenarios, which requires an explanation rooted in the WDS hydraulics. The 
demand multiplier is small for non-dominated scenarios associated with lower exposure 
because a portion of contaminant amount (which is low for these scenarios as shown in 
Fig. 2.9(a)) would be transported into the western side of the city and diluted under a 
 
Fig. 2.8. Schematic illustration of comparison of maximum-risk frontiers for 
baseline system (black squares) versus 2 potential mitigation plans (white circles and 
gray triangles).  The maximum risk product ensemble is outlined in each frontier by 
an ellipse; the maximum consequences ensemble is outlined in each by a rectangle 
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high demand multiplier. Comparing Fig. 2.9(b) with the MCS results presented in Fig. 
2.5 (b), it is observed that MCS is not capable of capturing this characteristic of critical 
scenarios associated with the East WTP. Fig. 2.9(b) also shows that the demand 
multiplier is smaller than one for all non-dominated scenarios for both WTPs, 
confirming that low demand times of year possess greater vulnerability. With the help of 
MCS results (Fig. 2.5(b)) and the shape of shifted Gamma distribution (where 
probability is maximum for a demand multiplier of one and decreases for other values), 
this can be attributed to the fact that exposure is smaller for larger demand multipliers 
while they are not necessarily more probable than demand multipliers smaller than one. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.9. Number of injected infective doses (a) and demand multiplier (b) associated 
with non-dominated contamination scenarios versus corresponding exposure for Giardia 
pathogen 
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2.5 Conclusions and Future Work 
The goal of this chapter has been to present a generally applicable set of 
information and methods for evidence-based risk analysis for accidental contamination 
events in water distribution systems.  The methods presented each have specific utilities: 
aggregate risk determination using MCS, and critical scenario identification by 
multiobjective optimization.  There also exist interesting complementarities: both can be 
used for sensitivity analysis to event attributes, and both can be used to evaluate possible 
risk-mitigation plans but with different measures. 
While a large set of contamination case studies was available for determination 
of event attribute properties, this type of risk-based analysis can only benefit by analysis 
of more events.  It is hoped that the water resources engineering and public health 
communities can cooperate to improve the quantitative aspects and availability of 
documentation of contamination events for this purpose.   
 We have also suggested the possibly conflicting natures of maximum-risk versus 
maximum-consequences driven decision making.  This is likely a fruitful area for further 
work to determine the magnitude of such conflicts and how far apart decisions reached 
by these philosophies are.  More advanced techniques of risk analysis such as the 
partitioned multiobjective risk method (Asbeck and Haimes 1984; Haimes 2009) can be 
extended for this purpose. 
 Information obtained about the probability of health impacts using Monte Carlo 
simulations may be used by the future research to construct f-N diagrams. These 
diagrams basically illustrate the annual contamination probability on the vertical axis vs. 
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health impacts on the horizontal axis. f-N diagrams are very useful for deciding on 
acceptable risk levels and consequently evaluating different available risk reductions 
measures. They have been used by the Unites States Bureau of Reclamation (2003) for 
dam safety decision making. 
Finally, this chapter did not account for human-infrastructure interactions that 
may occur as a contamination event unfolds – e.g., water demand reductions in response 
to utility warnings. Chapter 3 will incorporate consumer behavior (such as water demand 
changes and word of mouth communications) and the stochastic nature of these 
interactions in the methods presented in this chapter. This incorporation will more 
accurately mimic system behavior and evaluate contamination risks for the 
characterization of critical scenarios. 
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3. STATIC OPTIMIZATION OF CONTAMINANT FLUSHING AND 
CONTAMINANT MECHANISMS TO MINIMIZE HEALTH IMPACTS AND 
SYSTEM SERVICEABILITY INTERRUPTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Decisions on protecting public health against possible water contamination 
threats should be made with careful consideration of credibility of threat observations 
and unintended impacts of response implementation on water supply system 
serviceability.  To effectively cope with these threats there is a need to prepare 
contamination emergency management plans that describe the actions a drinking water 
utility needs to take in preparation for and in response to a contamination threat or 
incident. An emergency management plan should be based upon careful risk assessments 
and cover the four phases of hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency 
response, and disaster recovery (Lindell et al. 2006). 
A contamination emergency response phase is initiated with an actual (or 
potential) release of contaminant that is spreading (or will spread) across a WDS, and it 
extends until the situation is stabilized, when the risk of health impacts has returned to 
pre-event levels. An emergency response plan explains actions that managers may take 
in response to the perceived state of the system after the emergency begins, and it 
considers how best to achieve managers’ multiple objectives. These response actions can 
be classified as “assessment,” “corrective,” or “protective” actions, depending on 
whether they collect information about the state of the system, operate on the system to 
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decrease impacts, or require action by the public to reduce exposure (Perry and Lindell 
2007). 
Title IV of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (US Congress 2002) requires all community water systems 
serving a population greater than 3,300 to prepare or revise emergency response plans. 
The Response Protocol Toolbox (RPT) has been prepared by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA 2003) to help water utilities meet this 
requirement. It provides general guidelines on how response decisions should be made at 
the various stages of a contamination event as more information is gained. Because this 
toolbox is essentially a qualitative document, however, it does not provide specific 
guidance on how appropriate response strategies should be devised for a particular 
WDS. This chapter is focused on developing quantitative simulation-optimization 
models for preparation of emergency response plans that specify functional contaminant 
containment and flushing operation rules for achievement of conflicting response 
objectives. 
Contaminant containment through isolation valve operations is a corrective 
response action implemented to prevent contaminant spread to uncontaminated regions 
of a network and to preclude consumers from withdrawing contaminated water (USEPA 
2003). Decisions on combination of valves to be closed and timing must be made 
carefully and implemented quickly to be effective and minimize accompanying side 
consequences such as impacts on non-consumptive uses in isolated regions. Genetic 
algorithms (GA) (Baranowski and LeBoeuf 2008) and heuristic approaches (Poulin et al. 
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2008) have been employed to find locations of pipe closures necessary to reduce the 
contaminant concentration during an emergency. 
Contaminant flushing is another corrective response action that is executed 
through opening hydrants to discharge a large volume of contaminated water. System 
flushing should be planned and implemented carefully so that it is performed at the 
sections of the system where contaminant concentration is higher. Otherwise, it will 
worsen the situation by further spread of contaminated water to uncontaminated areas as 
it can considerably alter flow regime (USEPA 2003). Optimization tools have been used 
to explore performance of this response action for public health protection (Baranowski 
and LeBoeuf 2006, 2008; Zechman 2010). 
While emergency response plans are primarily implemented to protect public 
health, achievement of this goal might hinder meeting normal system operation 
objectives including suppression of urban fire events and service to residential, 
industrial, and commercial consumers. Water utilities must also operate in resource 
constrained environments in terms of finance, personnel, etc. An over-emphasis on 
vigilance against perceived contamination threats could divert needed resources from 
maintenance and other crucial activities. To date, limited research has addressed this 
multicriteria nature of the contamination emergency response problem (Preis and Ostfeld 
2008; Alfonso et al. 2010). Multiobjective frameworks proposed so far have only 
considered hydrant and valve locations as decision variables and have not optimized the 
operation timing. While these studies have considered the number of operational actions 
as an emergency response criterion, no attempt is made to explicitly address the 
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important criterion of system serviceability interruption. Most importantly, many 
previous single and multiobjective studies have used demand-driven analysis (DDA) to 
simulate WDS behavior, and this assumption inevitably limits the optimization search 
space to response plans that do not cause excessively low pressure in the WDS. This 
may unfavorably filter out many possible response plans with high potential to mitigate 
health impacts. 
In the light of these needs, this study develops and integrates pressure-driven 
analysis (PDA) and multicriteria models for optimization of emergency response plans 
with explicit consideration of two important response criteria: impacts on public health 
and system serviceability. The emergency response is treated as both single and 
multiobjective optimization problems to address utility managers’ needs under different 
situations, provide insight into effective response plans, and assess sensitivity of 
response to different parameters such as response delay. Operation rules for contaminant 
containment and flushing locations and timing are explicitly treated as optimization 
decision variables. Different formulations to quantify impacts on public health and 
service availability are examined with the help of an exposure model and the PDA. 
Performance of the proposed schemes is investigated using the Mesopolis virtual city 
WDS. 
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3.2 System Simulation Model 
3.2.1 Pressure-driven Hydraulic Analysis 
Behavior of WDS is generally simulated using standard hydraulic models like 
EPANET 2 (Rossman 2000) for applications such as design, operation, and 
rehabilitation. The conventional DDA approach uses nodal demands as an input in the 
pressure (head) calculations on the premise that these demands shall be satisfied at all 
conditions. Simulation models based on DDA typically reflect the network satisfactorily 
under normal conditions where pressures are sufficiently high. However, such models 
will distort the dynamics of real systems under the abnormal conditions of low pressures 
such as may be caused during the course of emergency and implementation of some 
corrective actions (e.g., high flows during hydrant flushing may lead to high head loss 
and depressed nodal pressures). Considering the limitations of DDA, PDA is employed 
here to more properly reflect the real behavior of the system. 
 A comprehensive review of pressure-deficient network predictors is performed 
by Gupta and Bhave (1996). They conclude that the method using parabolic head-
discharge relationship (Bhave 1981; Wagner et al. 1988; Chandapillai 1991) is the best 
for prediction of such conditions, and this method will be used in this chapter. In this 
method, a parabolic relationship is assumed between the service head seriH for node i  
and the minimum head miniH  needed to satisfy the nominal demand nomiQ : 
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where n = exponent corresponding to choice of head loss formula. 
The PDA is an iterative process. The nodal pressure heads are first calculated for 
the nominal demands using the DDA that is done here via EPANET toolkit. The results 
are then used in Equation (1) to correct the demands and re-estimate the network heads. 
This procedure is repeated until sufficient convergence is obtained. A convergence 
criterion thus needs to be devised, such as total change in network heads after each 
iteration or a preset maximum number of iterations, for every WDS application example. 
 
3.2.2 Exposure Model 
Adverse health impact, defined here as either the number of illnesses resulting 
from a contamination event or the total ingested contaminant mass, is calculated using a 
PDA-based hydraulic and water quality simulation model coupled with an exposure 
model. The quantity of contaminant ingested by individuals during a contamination 
event depends on water ingestion pattern, time-varying concentration of contaminant, 
and availability of drinking water. An individual is assumed to become ill if the 
cumulative amount of contaminant ingested during a contamination event exceeds a 
known infectious dose. The timing ingestion model selected for this study assumes that 
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tap water is ingested at the common starting times for the three major meals and times 
halfway between these meals, given that there is water available for drinking at a 
consumer’s demand node. The tap water intake rate used in the exposure model is 
central to accuracy of evaluated exposure and is obtained from USEPA (2004), provides 
estimates of per capita ingestion of community water.   
 
3.3 Response Optimization Framework 
Emergency response is a progressive, interactive, and adaptive process that 
includes parallel activities of assessing unusual contamination observations and making 
appropriate emergency response decisions. As more information is obtained about 
contamination, emergency management progresses through three threat stages of 
“possible,” “credible,” and “confirmatory” accompanied by an increase in seriousness of 
the threat impacts and magnitude of response decisions. While public health protection is 
the primary response focus, emergency management should carefully consider other 
potential consequences on infrastructure serviceability due to response implementation, 
specifically in the early stages of the process where the attack credibility level is 
relatively low. At this stage, a multiobjective response plan would be of substantial help 
for utility operators to identify the balance between actions taken to protect public health 
and limiting overaction that adversely impacts the ability of the system to meet multiple 
aspects of its overall mission. Nevertheless, if evaluation of collective threat information 
that progressively becomes available corroborates the threat warning and indicates that 
contamination is likely, all available resources must be utilized to minimize the single 
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objective of health impacts without further consideration of other response criteria. 
Under these circumstances, the large size of multiobjective optimization results may not 
be decipherable for making timely emergency decisions and use of a single-objective 
model becomes preferable. 
 
3.3.1 Mathematical Problem Formulation 
Quantification of emergency response criteria is the first step for the preparation 
of an optimization model. In reality, different measures may be formulated to quantify 
two important objectives of impacts on public health and system serviceability. This 
study investigates two distinct formulations for each of these criteria and analyses the 
sensitivity of optimal response plan to each quantification method. 
 Some studies have quantified the health impacts in terms of contaminant 
concentration in system nodes either as total contaminant concentration (Baranowski and 
LeBoeuf 2006, 2008) or total number of nodes with concentration above a specified 
threshold (Alfonso et al. 2010). This approach neither accounts for the ingestion timing 
and rate which can significantly influence estimated impacts (Davis and Janke 2008), 
nor does it consider the critical fact that the connections serving higher populations are 
comparatively more vulnerable. In general, health impacts metrics may be differentiated 
depending upon whether or not they are based on a threshold: i.e., number of 
people/nodes that experience a concentration or contaminant ingested mass above a 
threshold (Perelman and Ostfeld 2010; Zechman 2011) or sum of concentration or 
consumed mass for all nodes/people (Baranowski and LeBoeuf 2008; Preis and Ostfeld 
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2008).  Accordingly, with the help of the developed exposure model, the health impact 
criterion is quantified here as either the total number of sicknesses due to the 
contamination event or the total contaminant mass ingested by all people during the 
whole course of the event: 
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where pN = total number of people; i = a binary index; im = total contaminant mass 
ingested by individual i during the whole course of event that is calculated by the 
exposure model; dm = known infectious dose. The function 1Hf  explicitly represents the 
health impacts in terms of morbidity while 2Hf  projects the health consequences in the 
more implicit form of ingested mass. However, 2Hf  does not require that infectious dose 
be known in advance, which greatly simplifies the analysis since this value is often 
difficult to determine and subject to high variance among individuals. 
Interruption to system serviceability is also mathematically expressed using two 
different measures. The first measure is the total number of hours the volume of water 
supplied to consumers is below a certain percentage of their demand. Alternatively, the 
second measure sums up the difference between water demand and supply for all 
consumers during the whole course of the emergency. Mathematically,   
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where endt = duration of emergency response phase in hours; cN = total number of 
consumers; ti = a binary index; tiS = volume of water supplied to consumer i  at time 
step t  calculated by the PDA model; tiD = water demand of consumer i  at time step t ; 
= supply deficit threshold that ranges from 0 to 100%. The function 1Hf  treats all 
consumers equally while 2Hf  places more emphasis on consumers with higher water 
demand. It is noteworthy that both these metrics are always (unrealistically) calculated 
as zero if DDA is used. 
The objective functions described in Equations (3-2)-(3-5) are minimized 
through optimization of response actions of contaminant containment and flushing. 
Implementation of response actions should account for the response delay times between 
when intrusion starts and when injection of contaminant in the network is identified as 
likely or confirmed through multiple contamination trigger events. For system flushing, 
the decisions include the identification of the hydrants that should be opened to flush the 
contaminated water ( },...,,{ 21 hnhhhh ) and the time at which hydrants would be opened (
},...,,{ ,2,1, hnhhh tttht ) after the response delay. A maximum number of hydrants, hn , may 
be opened during the simulation and this depends on personnel and equipment 
availability. For contaminant containment, the decisions include the time at which 
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closure valve sets (CVS) would be closed ( },...,,{ ,2,1, snsss tttst ) after the response delay 
and the duration that the CVSs would remain closed ( },...,,{ ,2,1, snsss ttt sΔt ) where sn  
is the total number of CVSs. While every single pipeline may be theoretically considered 
as a possible closure location, this would result in a tremendously large decision space 
that may not be handled by the optimizer practically. Therefore, assessments need to be 
performed to identify the most reasonable configuration of these CVSs. This step helps 
construct a more compact isolation plan, supports the model with engineering 
knowledge, and reduces computational burden of the optimization process. Fig. 3.1 
shows an arbitrary timeline of contamination emergency period and response execution. 
It should be emphasized that the order of actions and time overlaps may be different for 
distinct events and emergency management plans. 
 
3.3.2 Optimization Algorithm 
Emergency decisions that should be optimized in response to a contamination 
 
Fig. 3.1. Arbitrary timeline of contamination emergency period 
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threat are diverse and discrete, and the relationship between decisions and performance 
is highly complex. Single and multiobjective genetic algorithms are developed here and 
coupled with the pressure-driven hydraulic simulator and exposure model for 
identification of emergency response planning. 
The single-objective model uses an elitist real-coded genetic algorithm with 
roulette wheel selection, simulated binary crossover (SBX) (Deb and Agrawal 1995), 
and polynomial mutation (Deb 2001). In the roulette wheel selection, the probability that 
a solution will be selected is given by the ratio of its fitness to the total fitness of other 
members of the current population. For hydrants identification, crossover and mutation 
operations are performed on longitude and latitude coordinates and the nearest hydrant 
to the generated coordinates is picked.   
In contrast to a single-objective optimization approach that searches for a single 
solution with the best scalar fitness value, multiobjective optimization seeks a set of 
trade-off solutions which together define the best multiobjective alternatives surface 
called the Pareto optimal front (Deb 2001). This study employs Non-dominated Sorting 
Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) that is an elitist evolutionary 
algorithm which benefits from a fast non-dominated sorting strategy and does not need 
any user-defined parameter for preserving diversity in Pareto optimal surface.  
 
3.4 Application Example 
The Mesopolis virtual city is used here to demonstrate the optimization of 
response actions using the proposed frameworks. The configuration of closure valve sets 
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is illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Two intentional contamination scenarios are selected for which 
the response actions are optimized. The settings and characteristics of these scenarios are 
shown in Table 3.1. The demand multiplier associated with each scenario is 
representative of aggregate water demand for a WDS that typically varies throughout the 
year. Contaminant agent is arsenic with an infectious dose of dm = 3.5 mg for a body 
weight of 70 kg as reported by Office of Environmental Health Assessment Services 
(1999) and daily water ingestion rate is 0.93 liter/day (USEPA 2004b). Both 
contamination scenarios occur in the third day of simulation after the system has reached 
dynamic equilibrium and the total simulation time is 6 days. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Configuration of closure valve sets in Mesopolis 
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To explore sensitivity of response plan performance, three values for response 
delay are used: 6, 12, and 24 hours. Similarly, the number of hydrants that may be 
opened for flushing is set to 3 and 5 in different cases; once opened, all hydrants remain 
open for 5 hours. Model emitter discharge coefficients for hydrants are set to 166.5 
gpm/psi0.5 (associated with a 3-inch diameter connection fire hydrant) to calculate 
pressure-driven outflow in the PDA model. Values of seriH  and 
min
iH for the PDA are 
based on engineering design standard of the cities of Bryan and College Station, Texas 
(Cities of Bryan and College Station 2005). Under normal conditions, a design head of 
35 psi should be maintained throughout the system, and no water is available at a 
connection if its pressure drops below 20 psi, the minimum allowed during fire flow 
conditions. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. Contamination scenarios 
Scenario Location 
Load 
(kilograms) 
Demand 
multiplier 
Start 
time 
Duration 
(hour) 
1Hf  
(people) 
2Hf  
(grams) 
1 
West 
WTP 
300 1.00 18:00 6 33,944 304.08
2 
East 
WTP 
300 1.00 19:00 5 54,638 397.28
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3.4.1 Single-objective Optimization 
The single-objective model is applied first to optimize hydrant operation for the 
minimization of health impacts considering both mathematical representations of 1Hf  
and 2Hf . Appropriate genetic algorithm settings are determined based on sensitivity 
analyses. The population size is set to 40, and the stopping criterion is set at 150 
generations. The crossover rate is set to the fixed value of 0.80, whereas mutation rate 
decreases linearly from 0.10 to 0.05 as a function of the generation number. SBX 
crossover distribution and polynomial mutation indices are set to 15 and 5, respectively. 
The optimal percentage reduction in health impacts versus the response delay is 
illustrated in Fig. 3.3 for both contamination scenarios and different numbers of hydrants 
used for flushing. Expectedly, the effectiveness of impact mitigation practices decreases 
as the utility operators respond later to a contamination incident. In this sense, 2Hf  
indicates a better projection of what we expect than 1Hf when the West WTP is 
contaminated (Scenario 1).  The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the response 
strategy of contaminant flushing when the response delay is reasonably short but the 
performance diminishes if response is implemented after one day. Overall, 
contamination would be more effectively mitigated if it occurs in West WTP as the 
affected area is much smaller than that associated with the East WTP contamination and 
thus more tractable.  
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Values of 1Hf  and 2Hf  project a scalar measure of the health impacts and do not 
provide distribution information on how much impacts are mitigated for different 
population sectors. Cumulative distribution curves of ingested contaminant mass are 
therefore prepared for optimal plans associated with both formulations as shown in Fig. 
3.4. The vertical axis indicates the percentage of total population that has ingested a 
mass of contaminant below the corresponding value on the horizontal axis. 1Hf  is the 
population on the vertical axis above the cross point of toxic dose line with each 
cumulative curve, while 2Hf  is the area between the curve and vertical axis after it is 
transformed to absolute population values i.e. the percentage values are multiplied by the 
total population of Mesopolis. For both Scenarios 1 and 2, optimization of response 
based on 2Hf  evidently outperforms 1Hf  except for the very limited population that 
ingest a mass of contaminant close to the toxic dose threshold of 3.5 mg. The conclusion 
Fig. 3.3. Percentage reduction in health impact using two formulations of (a) total 
number of sicknesses and (b) total ingested mass of contaminant 
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one can draw is that although using 1Hf  would decrease the number of sicknesses more (
1Hf curve is above 2Hf curve when they intersect with the toxic dose line), it will not 
protect the people overall as much as when 2Hf  is used ( 1Hf curve is overall more 
extended rightward than 2Hf curve). As observed in Fig. 3.4(a), it may even magnify the 
original risk for the people residing in highly contaminated areas (ingested mass above 
12 mg for this case). 
 Fig. 3.5 depicts the optimal location and timing for opening hydrants for 
response delays of 6 and 12 hours when hn = 5 and 2Hf  is considered as the health 
impacts metric. If West WTP is contaminated, all 5 hydrants should be opened in the 
western part of the city as this plant supplies water only to the western consumers. If 
Scenario 2 occurs (East WTP is the contaminant source), the optimal locations are 
spread around the contaminant source for response delay of 6 hours and move further 
Fig. 3.4. Ratio of total population with ingested mass above different levels for (a) 
Scenario 1 ( hn  = 3, delay = 6 hours) and (b) Scenario 2 ( hn  = 5, delay = 6 hours) 
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toward the east as delay is increased to 12 hours. A similar shift in optimal flushing 
locations is also observed for Scenario 1 where four out of five hydrants are opened in 
the western peninsula when delay is 12 hours compared to one out of five for a 6 hour 
response delay. Provision of these optimal response maps for finer discretization of 
response delay and other vulnerable nodes would serve as a supportive visual aid for 
utility managers to respond to the contamination in a more timely and efficient manner.  
 
3.4.2 Multiobjective Optimization 
Response actions of contaminant containment and flushing are next optimized 
simultaneously to minimize impacts on public health and system serviceability. CVSs 
Fig. 3.5. Optimal hydrant operation for minimizing health impacts quantified as 
total ingested mass of contaminant 
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are required to be configured before the optimization is performed. While more CVSs 
may theoretically result in greater reduction in health impacts due to a larger search 
space, a large set would lead to more elaborate response plans that may be burdensome 
to execute in practice and would also increase computational burden. CVSs with fewer 
included valves will minimize the number of operational actions needed to isolate an 
area. Nine CVSs are accordingly considered as shown in Fig. 4.2 based upon WDS 
layout, hydraulic simulations, and optimization computation intensity. CVS1, 2, and 3 
are located on long mains that transmit water to far sections of WDS. CVS4 allows 
isolation of a large eastern area through closing only two mains. Closure of CVS 5 and 6 
shuts down the East and West WTPs, respectively. CVS7 isolates the highly populated 
residential area in the western part of the city from both WTPs by closing only two 
mains. CVS8 allows the western area to be supplied by only West WTP. Finally, CVS9 
includes three mains and completely disconnects the eastern network from central and 
western areas.  
Fig. 3.6 shows the obtained Pareto optimal fronts for four possible combinations 
of objective functions represented by Eqs. (3.2)-(3.5). These fronts are for contamination 
Scenario 2, with response delay of 6 hours and hn = 5, representing a total number of 28 
decision variables (10 for hydrant opening and 18 for CVS operation).  
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The Pareto-fronts demonstrate that there are significant trade-offs between the 
response criteria of public health protection and system serviceability. In light of the fact 
that impacts on public health are considered more crucial, one may pose the question 
whether we should be concerned about the trade-offs at all. In the trade-off curves found 
here, each individual corrective action plan is associated with a level of reduction in 
health impacts and accompanied system disruption. A central point to remember is that, 
while implementation of such plan would lead to system disruption for certain, reduction 
in health impacts is conditioned on the credibility of threat observations (i.e., the RPT 
sequencing of possible, credible, and confirmatory threat stages). For the trade-off 
analysis to be rational, the horizontal axis should be multiplied by the probability that the 
contamination has actually occurred in order for it to be consistent with the vertical axis 
representing unconditioned system interruption. In reality, however, such probability 
values are not known exactly and must be inferred from an ensemble of uncertain sensor 
triggers and unusual observations.  Thus, the trade-off curves must be understood 
through this filter of threat uncertainty. 
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Fig. 3.7 illustrates the two extreme Pareto-optimal plans associated with 
minimum health impacts using 1Hf  (Plan 1) and 2Hf  (Plan 2) formulations in the 
decision space. The figure also shows the population frequency curve of contaminant 
mass ingestion. For Plan 2, closure of CVS8 and CVS4 would block further spread of 
contaminant to western and eastern regions of the city, respectively, and isolate the 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Pareto optimal fronts for impacts on public health ( 1Hf  and 2Hf ) and system 
serviceability ( 1Sf  and 2Sf ) 
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central area. Opening of five hydrants all located in the isolated central region will flush 
out the contaminant and protects the population in this area from contaminated water 
that is now even more concentrated due to the isolation. As observed in Fig. 3.7, this will 
essentially reduce ingested contaminant mass to zero for nearly 40% of the total 
population. For Plan 1, however, similar mechanics of isolation and discharge are not 
clearly observed; while closure of CVS4 would protect the eastern region, no action is 
taken to block further propagation of contamination across the western region as shown 
in Fig. 3.7. In fact, it is even determined to close the West WTP for 4 hours, increasing 
the pressure gradient between east and west and further intensifying contamination 
spread westward. Identification of this particular minimum-health-impact response plan 
by the optimization model is motivated by the expression of health impacts based upon a 
preset and fixed threshold. Instead of attempting to protect the whole population, the 
model tries to only decrease the number of people who have ingested a mass of 
contaminant above that threshold, which is partially achieved through distributing the 
injected mass across a larger area to lower the concentration. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
Compared to the single-objective approach, the multiobjective optimization of 
valves and hydrants produces response plan alternatives that reduce health impacts more 
effectively but at the cost of more service disruption and provide trade-off information 
between impacts on public health and system serviceability. The single-objective 
optimization of hydrants operation, on the other hand, is faster to implement, and results 
in a simpler decision-making process. Introduction of the multiobjective approach, 
therefore, does not make the use of single-objective approach obsolete but they 
complement each other. 
Several studies performed to address the risk of drinking water contamination 
have evaluated health impacts based upon a pre-specified exposure threshold. This 
metric has the advantage of being understandable and explicit as it communicates the 
Fig. 3.7. Pareto optimal response plans associated with minimum health impacts using 
metrics 1Hf  (Plan 1) and 2Hf  (Plan 2) along with ratio of total population with ingested 
mass above different levels 
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impacts sensibly in terms of number of sicknesses or deaths when thresholds are known 
accurately. However, findings of this paper indicate that using the alternative metric of 
total ingested mass of contaminant may lead to more effective optimal impact mitigation 
recommendations even if exposure thresholds can be estimated accurately. In this sense, 
quantification of health impacts as total mass of contaminant ingested by whole 
population may be preferable. This formulation also has the advantage that the optimal 
response plan found for a specific contamination scenario is still optimal for any other 
similar attack scenario with different contaminant type and loading. This is because this 
metric is a linear function of injected mass, whereas number of sicknesses and deaths 
vary nonlinearly as injected mass changes. Ideally, dose-response curves can be utilized 
after optimization is performed based upon total ingested contaminant mass metric to 
provide a more explicit and understandable presentation of adverse health consequences. 
The findings show that simultaneous hydrant and valve operation proves to be 
very effective as it reduces potential health impacts by 74% and 54% for 1Hf  and 2Hf  
formulations of health impacts, respectively; up to 45% and 35% reduction may be 
achieved when hydrants are operated only. However, this high reduction in possible 
health impacts is accompanied by water demand deficits, and trade-offs must be 
considered to choose the most appropriate response plan. The observation that reduction 
in health impacts is generally higher when it is expressed in terms of 1Hf  than 2Hf  
should not imply that consideration of 1Hf  leads to more effective response plans but 
performance associated with each metric must be viewed in the context of its definition 
independently. 
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Delay between when contamination starts and when utility operators decide to 
respond the event substantially reduces effectiveness of risk reduction attempts. Because 
implementation of response optimization schemes is computationally intensive for large 
water distribution networks, their direct application after the event begins is not 
reasonable unless simplifications are made to the network or genetic algorithm search is 
guided with good solutions obtained from previous runs or expert knowledge. These 
schemes may be applied to a set of design basis threats during the preparedness phase to 
infer patterns in optimal response plans and provide insights to be used in the event of 
contamination. This large set of threat-response data – also called the Response Planning 
Matrix in RPT (USEPA 2003) – may be also used by decision support systems and data 
mining models to aid utility operators in rapidly making most effective decisions. Future 
efforts are required to develop such decision aid tools and learning algorithms.  
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4. STATIC OPTIMIZATION OF FOOD-GRADE DYE INJECTION ALERTING 
MECHANISMS TO MINIMIZE HEALTH IMPACTS AND FALSE 
WARNINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As a water distribution system (WDS) contamination threat or incident unfolds, 
water utility operators may take different assessment, preventive, and protective actions. 
Assessment actions collect information about the state of the system and may include 
sensor data analysis, contaminant source identification, and community impacts 
evaluation (Lindell and Prater 2003; Janke et al. 2006; Davis and Janke 2011; Liu et al. 
2011). Preventive actions operate on the system to decrease impacts and may consist of 
hydrant opening for flushing, valve closure for isolation, and chlorine injection for 
disinfection (Baranowski et al. 2008; Parks and VanBriesen 2009). Protective actions 
require action by the public to reduce exposure and might include broadcasting general 
or targeted protective action recommendations (Zechman 2011). 
Food-grade dye injection is a potential method for alerting a local population that 
its tap water might be contaminated. This strategy is mentioned in Module 5 of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency Response Protocol Toolbox (USEPA 2004a) as a 
novel response action. Yet, despite its significant potential for use as an alerting 
mechanism, no previous analysis is known that has systematically modeled its 
implementation and investigated its performance for community health protection 
against municipal water contamination. This challenge is the focus of this chapter.   
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The suitability of different preventive and protective response actions may be 
evaluated based upon certain emergency response criteria including magnitude of 
desired effects, cost, time to implement, and unintended consequences. Performance in 
reducing public health impacts and accompanying sociopolitical consequences is the 
most important criterion. A response strategy should be effective, dependable, and 
robust. Preventive actions of hydrant opening and valve closure, for example, are 
promising tools, but a lack of understanding of WDS hydraulics could lead to ineffective 
response or worsened impacts. Chlorine disinfection boosters may not be effective 
against certain contaminants (e.g., cryptosporidium oocysts). Actions are more desirable 
if they impose lower direct costs for labor, equipment, and materials. Unintended 
consequences like indirect costs (system infrastructure recovery expenses, business 
disruption losses, etc.), firefighting interruption, and public alarm are also important due 
to utility operators’ concerns over budget limitations and public trust. Isolation valve 
closure could potentially carry high recovery costs (e.g., due to water hammer damages) 
and significant consequences for industrial and firefighting uses.  Execution errors in 
chorine disinfection practices could cause problems ranging from minor taste and odor 
changes to significant consumer health risk. The possibility of alerting consumers in 
uncontaminated regions is a possible adverse side effect of warning broadcasts 
(commercial radio and TV, reverse 911, sirens, etc.) that may generate antagonism 
toward officials particularly if contamination reports are not credible enough. A 
summary of how various preventive and protective response actions perform on the basis 
of these criteria is presented in Table 4.1. In this table, effectiveness denotes the 
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Table 4.1. Review of different possible WDS contamination emergency response 
actions 
Option Effectiveness 
Direct 
Cost 
Time to 
Implement 
Unintended Consequences 
Hydrant opening 
Variable, dependent 
on event 
understanding 
Low Hours 
Could worsen contaminant 
spread 
Isolation valve 
closure 
High if contaminant 
spread well 
understood 
Low Hours 
No fire flow or non-
consumptive uses; potential 
damage to WDS 
Chlorine 
disinfection 
Variable based on 
contaminant 
High Days 
Potential false sense of security; 
alarming taste  
Preventive action 
recommendations 
Variable, dependent 
on warning medium 
and public access to 
media 
Low to 
medium 
Hours 
Possible false public alerting; 
could lead to “over-compliance” 
Do nothing N/A None None 
Continued exposure of 
consumers 
 
percentage reduction in direct consequences of the contamination if it has indeed 
occurred.   
This study formulates the decision making problem of food-grade dye injection 
and structures a multicriteria simulation-optimization framework for determination of 
best alerting mechanisms. Health impact reduction and false alert prevention are 
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independently treated as conflicting emergency decision making objectives. The 
simulation model comprises WDS hydraulics and quality simulators integrated with an 
exposure model that together evaluate the two criteria of public health consequences and 
size of the population alerted. A multiobjective genetic algorithm is used to minimize 
these emergency response objectives through optimizing dye injection practices. Post-
processing is performed on Pareto-optimal solutions obtained by the optimization model 
to address the additional response criterion of implementation costs. The proposed 
multicriteria emergency management scheme is demonstrated using the WDS of 
Mesopolis virtual city. 
 
4.2 Simulation Model 
Both EPANET (Rossman 2000) and the multispecies extension to EPANET 
(EPANET-MSX) (Shang et al. 2008) may be used to simulate system hydraulics and 
propagation of contaminant introduced at a contamination site and dye injected by the 
utility. EPANET-MSX allows for a single simulation that considers the transport of the 
contaminant and the dye while EPANET requires separate simulation of the contaminant 
and the dye. This study uses the standard (single species) version of EPANET for 
extended simulation because it is less computationally intensive overall and easier to 
implement by utility operators. The contaminant and dye transport is simulated here as a 
perfect tracer: decay, density effects, and reaction with wall materials and other 
dissolved species are not taken into account. 
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The quantity of contaminant ingested by individuals during a contamination 
event depends on water ingestion pattern, time-varying concentration of the contaminant 
and dye, and water consumption choices made by the consumers under an unfolding 
contamination event. The timing-of-ingestion model considered here presumes that tap 
water is ingested at the regular starting times for the three main meals (7:00, 12:00, and 
18:00) and times halfway between these meals (9:30 and 15:00). The tap water intake 
rate is here set to 0.93 L/day based upon USEPA (2004b). 
Changes in consumers’ water consumption choices after they observe dye in the 
tap water may depend on multiple factors such as age, gender, education, and ethnicity 
as well as dye color, intensity, and concentration. Different people may react in distinct 
ways. They may merely ignore color changes and keep drinking tap water as before, 
cease drinking water only at the times the changes in color are noticeable, or totally stop 
drinking water for a period of time after they observe the intense dye in the tap water. 
Moreover, consumers might also suspend contact uses, such as hand washing, 
dishwashing, and bathing after they observe dye. Other non-consumptive uses, however, 
may continue, such as toilet flushing, landscape watering, and pipe leaks. Since the 
hydraulic conditions in the system are dictated by the demands of consumers, these 
water consumption choices made by the consumers subsequently influence the hydraulic 
state of the network, and thus the spread of the contaminant plume in the system.  
No qualitative or quantitative study or public survey is known that has addressed 
changes in consumers’ ingestion choices after the observation of dye in the tap water. 
This study is thus performed based upon a certain set of assumptions. It is presumed that 
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consumers stop drinking water for the rest of the simulation period after they observe 
dye in the tap water with a concentration above a relatively high threshold. The 
simulation model checks this observation only at the ingestion times described in the 
timing ingestion model. To account for the fact that people may not observe the dye in 
tap water during the night, only the time period between 7:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M. is 
considered for the period that people can stop drinking. Moreover, this study does not 
consider the influence of changes in consumer behavior on the hydraulics of the system. 
Agent-based modeling framework developed by Zechman (2011) may be employed to 
incorporate consumers’ mobility, reduction of water demand, and word-of-mouth 
communication in the modeling schemes proposed here. 
There exist a variety of food-grade dyes that may be utilized for injection. Allura 
Red dye (also known as “Red 40” and “E129”) is considered in this study because of 
several advantages. It has an intense red color with high potential to strongly discourage 
people from ingesting contaminated water. It is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (USFDA 2012) for food use and does not pose any additional health risk 
to consumers. Moreover, it is relatively inexpensive and widely available for water 
utility use. In this study, the concentration threshold that causes people to stop drinking 
water is assumed equal to the concentration of Allura Red in commercial soft drinks -- 
roughly 25 mg/L as reported by Lopez-de-Alba et al. (1996; 2001). Public surveys are 
required for accurate calculation of this threshold and associated variance and 
uncertainties.  
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4.3 Optimization Framework  
4.3.1 Problem Statement 
Public officials with the authority to issue protective action recommendations 
face a difficult trade-off between health protection and possible false warning. 
Emergency decisions are made based upon imperfect information, in the form of 
uncertain threat observations, subjective system understanding, and approximate model 
predictions. Therefore, there is always a possibility that the contamination trigger events 
are false, and the managers thus may be falsely alarmed. Even if contamination has truly 
occurred, there is a possibility that false public alerting may occur; this would happen if 
people residing in the geographical areas that are not at risk of contamination observe 
dye in the tap water. Therefore, while injection of dye would discourage public 
consumption of potentially contaminated water to reduce health impacts, it should be 
executed such that it only targets regions or consumers that are (or will in the future be) 
exposed to the contaminant.  
Thus, there is a conflict between reduction of potential health consequences (with 
consideration of threat credibility) and minimizing the magnitude of possible false public 
alerting. Considering the unquestionable fact that community health consequences are 
much more significant, one may pose the question whether emergency managers should 
be concerned about the trade-offs at all. Trade-offs among response objectives (that are 
the outcome of the optimization framework) are schematically illustrated in Fig. 5.1 to 
elucidate this critical dilemma. Every single dye injection plan from the trade-off front 
illustrated here corresponds to a decrease in possible health consequences and an 
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increase in the extent of public alerting (which could be potentially false).  Since the 
occurrence of health impacts is conditioned on the occurrence of a contamination event, 
for the trade-off analysis to be realistic, the horizontal axis must be transformed to 
expected value to be explicitly comparable to the vertical axis, which represents 
unconditioned public alerting. This can be achieved by multiplying the horizontal axis 
by the conditional probability that the incident has indeed occurred given that a 
contaminant sensing system has reported “positive.” Such probability values, however, 
are not known with certainty in reality and must be deduced from a chain of uncertain 
sensor readings and unusual observations. The optimization model theoretically finds a 
set of alerting mechanisms that cause minimized false alerting in regions that are not 
prone to the contamination. Nevertheless, it does not guarantee the alerting in risk areas 
is not false as it takes occurrence of contamination for granted in this chapter. Future 
research will incorporate likelihood of contamination (based on sensor network 
properties) and expected value of health consequences. 
 67
Every alerting mechanism has execution expenses, which are another response 
criterion to consider simultaneously. The problem of dye injection is therefore a 
multicriteria decision problem, which is addressed here using a multiobjective 
optimization approach. Since dye injection is a subset of preventive response actions that 
are more appropriate to be implemented after threat credibility elevates to ‘credible’ or 
‘confirmatory’ level, the response criterion of cost is considered less important than the 
two critical criteria of protecting health and avoiding unnecessary public alerting. 
Accordingly, multiobjective optimization is first performed considering only the two 
latter criteria, and post-processing is performed later on optimization results to account 
for the implementation cost criterion. 
There exist different possible ways to quantify health impacts due to water 
contamination and the extent of public alert as a result of dye observation. Public health 
impacts are expressed here as the total ingested mass (TIM) of contaminant by all 
 
Fig. 4.1. Non-dominated alerting mechanisms (shown as filled circles) 
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consumers during the course of a contamination incident because it removes the need to 
specify an infectious or lethal threshold in advance. Public alerting is quantified as the 
number of people who observe colored water with concentration of dye above the preset 
threshold and consequently stop drinking water. In mathematical terms, the 
multiobjective optimization problem for the minimization of public exposure ( 1f ) and 
the extension of public alert ( 2f ) is expressed as: 
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where CN = number of consumers, IN = number of water ingestion events for each 
consumer,  jiV , = volume of water ingested by consumer j  at ingestion event i , and i = 
a binary variable that is 1 if consumer j  is alerted by dye presence and 0 otherwise. The 
decisions that should be optimized for dye injection include: (1) the location(s) for 
inserting dye into the WDS, (2) mass of dye injected in each location, and (3) duration of 
injection. Sensitivity analyses should be performed to assess efficacy of response for 
different numbers of locations and the response delay between the start of contaminant 
intrusion and when injection of contaminant in the network is identified as likely or 
confirmed through multiple contamination trigger events. 
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4.3.2 Solution Algorithm 
The underlying hydraulics of the WDS coupled with the exposure and quality 
simulation models suggests that the optimization problem involves both significant 
nonlinearities and a high potential for multi-modality. Genetic algorithms (GAs) have 
been demonstrated as flexible and powerful tools for solving such challenging 
optimization problems in the discipline of water resources planning and management 
(Nicklow et al. 2010). NSGA-II is employed here uses simulated binary crossover 
(SBX) (Deb and Agrawal 1995), and polynomial mutation (Deb 2001) for reproduction 
of new solutions (injection location, mass, and duration). To explore new locations, 
reproduction operators are performed on geographical coordinates of the parent solutions 
and the nearest intermediate node in the network is selected for offspring solutions. 
  
4.4 Application 
Virtual city of Mesopolis is used to demonstrate optimization of dye injection 
using the proposed framework. Two contamination scenarios are selected for which the 
dye injecting alerting mechanisms are optimized (Table 4.2). The low rate of 
contaminant ingestion is consistent with the fact more than 99.8% of WDS inflow goes 
to non-ingestive uses. The demand multiplier associated with each scenario is 
representative of aggregate water demand for a WDS that typically varies throughout the 
year. The contaminant agent is arsenic with a toxic dose of 3.5 mg (milligram) for a 
body weight of 70 kg as reported by Office of Environmental Health Assessment 
Services (1999). While optimization is performed here considering only TIM as the 
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health consequences metric, obtained results may be used to gain approximate 
information on reduction in number of sicknesses too. Total simulation time is 6 days 
with both contamination scenarios occurring on the third day of the simulation after the 
system has reached dynamic equilibrium. Total cost of each dye injection mechanism is 
considered here to be the sum of cost of all injectors and total mass of dye used. Price of 
each dye injector unit and unit mass (kg) of dye are set to $10,000 and $180, 
respectively.  A dye injector unit is conceived here as a portable, trailer-mounted 
apparatus consisting of a pump, motor, dye tank, and hoses that could be connected to a 
hydrant. 
Appropriate NSGA-II parameters settings are determined based on sensitivity 
analyses. The population size is set to 100 and the stopping criterion is achieved when 
the total number of generations reaches 150. Crossover and mutation rates are 0.85 and 
0.07 and SBX crossover distribution and polynomial mutation indices are set to 15 and 
5, respectively. The convergence history during the evolution process for contamination 
scenario 2, a 6-hour response delay, and 5 dye injection locations is shown in Fig. 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Contaminant source characteristics and associated health impacts 
Scenario Location 
Load 
(kilograms) 
Demand 
multiplier 
Start 
time 
Duration 
(hour) 
# of 
sicknesses 
TIM 
(grams) 
1 
West 
WTP 
300 1.00 18:00 6 33,944 323.75 
2 
East 
WTP 
300 1.00 19:00 5 54,638 402.06 
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As the algorithm proceeds, the population evolves from a scattered cluster mostly 
concentrated in high-health-impact and low-public-alerting zone to a diverse Pareto 
optimal front. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Optimization convergence history for Scenario 2, 6-hour response delay, and 5 
dye injectors 
 
Pareto optimal fronts obtained for different configurations of the alerting system 
(i.e., number of dye injection locations and response delay times) are shown in Fig. 4.3. 
These results clearly indicate the very significant trade-offs between minimization of 
health impacts and extent of public alerting, which is not surprising. Comparatively, 
injection of dye can more effectively reduce health impacts where the West WTP is 
contaminated (Scenario 1). The reduction in TIM can be as high as 90% which 
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hour response delay, this reduction is quite significant (62%). Difference in effectiveness 
of dye injection for two scenarios associated with the West and East WTPs is rooted in 
WDS hydraulics. The East WTP supplies a much larger area than the West WTP so it is 
more difficult to manage the impacts when the East WTP is contaminated. This also 
clarifies the noticeable difference between the maximum number of people that are 
alerted in each scenario. The population of the western region is 37,099 in Scenario 1 
whereas there is a much larger population (110,414 people, approximately 75% of the 
city’s population) to be alerted in Scenario 2. 
Fig. 4.3(a) indicates that increasing the number of injection locations from 3 to 5 
does not result in any noticeable improvement in the solutions for contamination of the 
West WTP (Scenario 1). If the East WTP is contaminated (Scenario 2), by contrast, this 
increase in injection locations enhances the effectiveness of non-dominated alerting 
 
Fig. 4.3. Pareto optimal fronts for contamination Scenarios 1 (a) and 2 (b) 
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strategies as shown in Fig. 4.3(b). This observation may also be explained by the spatial 
difference in impact area associated with each contamination scenario. Contamination of 
the East WTP impacts a much larger area and, therefore, an increase in the number of 
injection locations would allow the water managers to alert more consumers and 
consequently achieve higher protection.  
Fig. 4.4 illustrates the optimal alerting systems associated with minimum health 
impacts for a 6-hour response delay with 3 and 5 locations for Scenario 1 and 2, 
respectively. This figure provides insight into the optimal decision space and supports 
the information presented in Fig. 4.3 on the optimal objective space. Unsurprisingly, the 
best injection locations are large transmission mains in the network. These locations 
allow a larger fraction of total population to be alerted to existence of contaminant in the 
tap water. There are some dye injection locations in the alerting system that are 
relatively far from contaminant sites. Further analysis inspired by these observations 
indicates that injection of dye at these points alerts people residing in far regions before 
contaminant even reaches them. This action, therefore, completely reduces the exposure 
risk for these population segments. 
Results presented in Fig. 4.4 generally show that the alerting system would be 
more effective if dye is injected during a short time. This result might be due to the 
assumptions about people’s response after they observe dye in their tap water. As 
mentioned earlier, it is presumed that people stop drinking after dye concentration 
exceeds a threshold. The optimization model selects shorter injection durations that 
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result in higher peaks in the dye concentration time series, which subsequently increases 
the chance of exceeding the threshold. 
Population segments in the city ingest different levels of contaminant mass and 
observe different concentrations of dye in the water. Fig. 4.5 visualizes ingested 
contaminant mass per capita and maximum observed dye concentration for different 
population sectors. These results are associated with the minimum-TIM non-dominated 
alerting system for 6- and 12-hour response delays with 3 locations for Scenario 1.  
 
Fig. 4.4. Minimum-TIM non-dominated alerting mechanisms (injection locations, 
mass, and duration) for a 6-hour response delay with 3 and 5 injectors for Scenarios 1 
and 2, respectively 
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Figs. 4.5 (a) and (c) indicate ingested mass of contaminant per capita for the case 
in which the population takes no protective actions in response to the alerting system 
whereas Figs. 4.5 (b) and (d) provide the same results for the case in which they do take 
protective actions. As shown for both response delays, a large fraction of total 
population (109,298) is located in safe areas (central and eastern region) that are never 
contaminated. The optimization algorithm configures injection locations, mass, and 
duration such that this large population segment never observes any dye in the water 
and, accordingly, is not unnecessarily alerted. It alerts the rest of population that is at the 
risk of contamination to take protective actions. While people would stop drinking 
contaminated water if the dye concentration exceeds a fixed threshold, interestingly, the 
figure indicates that for the 6-hour response delay, maximum observed dye 
concentration is generally greater for population sectors that are at higher risk. Since 
these consumers contribute more to the overall health impact, the optimizer tries to 
locate injection points closer to these regions to more quickly alert those consumers.  
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Figs. 4.5 (b) and (d) indicate how the health consequences are changed for 
increased delays to the start of dye injection: here, delays of 6 and 12 hours, 
respectively. A 6-hour delay response both reduces the impacts generally and dampens 
 
Fig. 4.5. Contaminant-dye targeting performance (a and c) for minimum-TIM alerting 
protocols with 3 injectors for Scenario 1. The distribution of reduction in health impacts 
through executing the dye injection protocols is shown by the shifting of cells toward 
the vertical axis (b and d). The black cell at the origin indicates that 109,298 persons are 
never exposed to the contaminant or dye. 
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the extreme impacts noticeably. If delay reaches 12 hours, however, the response is not 
as effective in reducing severe impacts. Population segments associated with these high 
values of ingested contaminant mass are those residing around the large mains near the 
contamination source (West WTP) where a 12-hour delay is long enough for the 
consequences to become severe. Nevertheless, people living in more distant areas can be 
alerted before the contaminant plume reaches them. For these population segments, the 
ingested contaminant mass becomes zero as shown in Fig. 4.5. In particular, this 
includes the people residing in the isolated western peninsula, the farthest district from 
the contamination source. On the contrary, certain exposed population segments never 
observe a dye concentration above the stop-drinking threshold. The health impacts 
associated with these consumers are thus never prevented; essentially, the optimizer 
“gives up” on populations that it cannot help. As expected, Fig 4.5 indicates this 
population segment increases in number when response is executed later. A fraction of 
this population comprises the people living in the vicinity of the large water main who 
are exposed for a short period soon after the contamination starts. Alerting is thus of 
limited effect when the response delay is close to or longer than this exposure period. 
Due to the lower importance of response implementation costs at the stage of the 
emergency when the presence of contaminant is deemed credible, these expenses were 
not addressed directly in the optimization process. However, to avoid unnecessary 
expenses, post-processing can be performed in the optimization results to quantify cost 
associated with each alert system option. The optimization model is first run for different 
numbers of injectors ranging from 1 to 9 for Scenario 2 considering public health and 
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extent of population alerting as objectives. Thereafter, obtained Pareto-fronts are 
combined and the cost associated with each response is calculated. Non-domination 
sorting is consequently performed considering the health, alerting, and cost as sorting 
criteria and the non-dominated mechanisms are determined. Fig. 4.6 indicates the non-
dominated solutions in the objective space where color coding is used to illustrate the 
cost criterion. While the reduction in health impacts becomes negligible after the number 
of injectors exceeds 6, the response costs consistently rise the number of injectors. 
Nevertheless, although use of fewer injectors would be just as effective in limiting the 
impacts at lower costs, this protection may not be achieved unless greater public alerting 
takes place. This observation is due to the fact that optimization model can take 
advantage of a greater flexibility in configuring the alerting mechanism when more 
injectors are used. These results are particularly helpful for estimating the minimum 
number of injectors that a utility should install in order to guarantee the most effective 
response in case an emergency occurs. Since these results are for the scenario that the 
East WTP is contaminated (which results in the largest contamination spread area), the 
number of injectors selected for this scenario would suffice in case any other location in 
the city experiences contaminant intrusion.  
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4.5 Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter has demonstrated that food-grade dye injection in water distribution 
networks holds promise as an effective strategy for reduction of health impacts due to 
contamination. It is relatively inexpensive, easy, and quick to implement, causes no 
physical damage to system infrastructure, and does not interrupt fire protection and other 
non-consumptive uses. However, managers’ overaction and lack of the WDS hydraulics 
understanding may result in unnecessary public alerting for population segments not 
residing in risk areas. The mathematical problem formulation and multiobjective 
 
Fig. 4.6. Alerting protocols for Scenario 2 with different trade-offs between public 
health, alarm, and execution cost for varying number of dye injectors (I) 
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simulation-optimization framework proposed in this chapter can provide a meaningful 
guide for utility operators to effectively reduce health impacts without unnecessary 
public alerting. It serves a population protection function by recommending protective 
response actions for areas determined or predicted to be at higher risk from 
contamination impact.  The algorithms can be used to guide decisions on equipment and 
material needs for alerting as well as formulation of response plans. 
The optimization results indicate that the dye would be better injected in larger 
mains at points that are not all located in the vicinity of the contamination source. 
Injection at larger mains assures more people are notified while spread of injection 
locations enhances timeliness of warning by notifying people before the contaminant 
plume reaches them. Assuming that people will stop drinking water after they observe a 
concentration of dye above a threshold, the entire amount of dye would be better injected 
during a short time period to maximize peak dye concentration. Injection of dye in more 
locations would enhance both the level of impact reduction and the number of people 
alerted for the same level of protection but at the cost of higher direct expenses. This 
improvement is achieved through a more uniform and guided dye concentration through 
the system. Nevertheless, no further enhancement is achieved after the number of 
injectors exceeds a certain level, which can be determined through a sensitivity analysis 
for the set of contamination scenarios that result in most severe consequences.  
Food-grade dye injection modeling and practice is in its infancy and extensive 
future research is required to address various sociotechnical aspects. Expectations about 
people’s behavior during contamination impacts shapes the way that emergency 
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managers plan for emergency response. Public surveys should be conducted to collect 
data on consumers’ perception to guide the development of a sociotechnical model that 
accurately predicts people’s water consumption after they observe dye in their tap water. 
This would help to produce more accurate calculation of health impacts and public 
alerting for more realistic evaluation of dye injection functions.  
Future work should explore the effects of dye injection when it is executed in 
combination with other response actions such as contaminant containment and warnings 
broadcast through the media and other mechanisms. Public education would also be of 
considerable value to prepare people for possible observation of dye in their tap water. 
This would help to increase compliance and would also alleviate utility operators’ 
concerns that consumers will be unnecessarily distressed and not know what to do when 
they see intense dye color in their tap water.  
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5. DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION OF FLUSHING AND ALERTING 
MECHANISMS TO MINIMIZE HEALTH IMPACTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The models presented in Chapters 3 and 4 applied static optimization approaches 
to find Pareto-optimal response plans on the implicit assumption that system behavior 
and contamination source characteristics remain unchanged once a contamination event 
begins and model computation is started. Mathematically, this assumption implies that 
the response optimization fitness functions (e.g., minimization of ultimate health 
impacts) are not time-varying and are not subject to feedback mechanisms driven by 
dynamically introduced system parameters. In other words, the objective function is not 
changing during the optimization process. In reality, however, the fitness functions are 
feedback-influenced by several system parameters that change over time as the 
emergency proceeds. The decision support model should thus explicitly account for the 
changing behavior of the system to realistically identify effective contamination risk 
mitigation decisions in a timely manner. 
Dynamic optimization techniques have been successfully applied in different 
engineering disciplines for solving optimization problems in changing environments. 
Applications include products pricing (e.g., Besbes and Zeevi 2009), vehicle routing 
(e.g. Khouadjia et al. 2010), contaminant source characterization (e.g., Liu et al. 2011), 
chemical batch process scheduling (e.g., Nie et al. in press), and mission planning (e.g., 
Bui et al. in press). Dynamic optimization methods methodically transfer useful 
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knowledge from previous environments and maintain adaptability to guide and speed up 
the search in changed environments.  
This chapter develops a dynamic simulation-optimization model for 
identification and tracking of time-varying optimal response to provide emergency 
mangers with realistic, real-time decision support. The adaptive simulation model 
accounts for multiple sources of uncertainty and variability, including perceived 
contaminant source attributes, consumers’ water use, and emergency management 
operations. This dynamic optimization scheme uses an evolutionary-computation-based 
multiobjective approach where the adaptability and diversity in the search process are 
preserved through defining and maximizing an artificial diversification objective. The 
proposed decision support scheme is demonstrated and discussed on a WDS that 
possesses the spatial and temporal complexity of real-world systems. 
 
5.2 Dynamic Environment Simulation  
In the context of WDS dynamics during normal operation, a system is expected 
to exist in a dynamic equilibrium where system behavior follows a repeating consistent 
pattern that is known with acceptable accuracy. As a WDS is contaminated, the water 
system exhibits a complex and uncertain behavior that significantly deviates from the 
normal operation conditions. Knowledge of contaminant source characteristics that 
dictate emergency response decisions evolves as more information streams in over time. 
Emergency mangers change system normal operation conditions and alert consumers 
based upon their current assessment of the state of the system. Warned or sickened 
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consumers subsequently change their water consumption choices, which consequently 
affect network hydraulics and contaminant plume spread. Conceptualizing and modeling 
these different sources of uncertainty and complexity is fundamental to realistic 
simulation of system behavior and effective reduction of contamination risks. 
 
5.2.1 Contaminant Source Perceived Attributes 
The perceived attributes of a contamination event, including the location, 
strength, time, and duration, are estimated through integrated assessment of different 
system observations and evidence that streams from physical security alarms, sensor 
networks, and consumers’ complaints. Bayesian and optimization models have been 
applied to process the streaming data in real-time and update estimated source 
characteristics based on observations up to the current time (Wesley et al. 2006; Liu et 
al. 2011). Since the perceived source characteristics dictate the suitability of mitigation 
strategies taken, the optimization process needs to adapt to these changes to be capable 
to continuously track the optimum in a time-varying search space. The dynamic model 
proposed in this chapter adapts optimal response decisions to changing perceived source 
characteristics in real-time through systematic preservation of diversity in the search 
procedure. 
 
5.2.2 Water Utility Operations 
In the event that a contaminant is introduced to a WDS, water utility operators 
may take different assessment, preventive, and protective actions to protect public 
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health. These actions taken by the utility managers will change the normal hydraulic 
conditions, and thus the propagation of the contaminant plume, in the system. 
Implementation of response actions thus alters public health consequences and changes 
the effectiveness of future response decisions. Effectiveness of risk reduction measures 
also degrades as time passes due to wider spread of contaminant and prolonged exposure 
of public to the contaminant. The dynamic simulation model developed here adaptively 
evaluates the effectiveness of different response actions through consideration of the 
increasing response time delay and the effect of previously executed actions on system 
behavior. Two response strategies of hydrant operation for contaminant flushing and dye 
injection for public warning are included in the model. No other warning systems are 
used here. 
  
5.2.3 Consumer Behavior 
Different consumers ingest varying amounts of contaminant depending upon 
time-varying concentration of the contaminant and dye in their tap water, and the water 
consumption choices they make under the unfolding contamination incident. The 
exposure model used in this study assumes consumers ingest tap water at the typical 
starting times for the three main meals (7:00, 12:00, and 18:00) and times halfway 
between these meals (9:30 and 15:00). The tap water ingestion rate for every consumer 
is set to 0.93 L/day in the model.  
Consumers cease drinking tap water when they become aware that their tap water 
is contaminated. This happens either when they are sickened and assume tap water is the 
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cause or when they observe intense dye color in their tap water. A series of rules needs 
to be defined for modeling consumers’ reactions and their water usage changes. 
Consumers are sickened and experience symptoms once they ingest a threshold toxic 
dose and a certain time period passes after the threshold is exceeded. The contaminant 
agent used here is arsenic with a toxic dose of 3.5 mg for a body weight of 70 kg as 
reported by Office of Environmental Health Assessment Services (1999). The model 
assumes that within one hour after this toxic dose is ingested, the consumers experience 
symptoms. Consumers may also be altered through observation of dye. It is presumed 
that they become alerted and cease drinking water for the rest of contamination incident 
once the dye concentration exceeds a relatively high threshold. The simulation model 
checks this observation of high-intensity dye only at the daily ingestion times described 
in the time-of-ingestion model. Allura Red dye (also known as “Red 40” and “E129”) is 
chosen in this study among different available food-grade dyes because of several 
advantages.  
These water usage reduction choices made by alerted consumers influence the 
hydraulic state of the network, and thus the spread of the contaminant plume in the 
system. Consumers may suspend contact uses, such as hand washing, dishwashing, and 
bathing after they become alert to the contamination. Other non-consumptive uses, 
however, may continue, such as toilet flushing, landscape watering, and pipe leaks. Such 
uses are assumed to comprise on average 60%, 51%, and 43% of the total demand for 
low, medium, and high density residential demands, respectively, using the information 
reported by Vickers (2001) for urban water use. It is assumed the residential users reduce 
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their water usage to these values after they are alerted. Industrial users are assumed to 
maintain 96% of their total water usage. A more realistic model may be developed 
through incorporation of consumers’ mobility and word-of-mouth using, for instance, 
the complex agent-based modeling framework developed by Zechman (2011). 
 
5.2.4 Network Hydraulic Simulation 
EPANET software is used for hydraulic simulation of the WDS. It is a publicly 
available hydraulic and water quality modeling program developed by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (Rossman 2000). It provides an integrated computer 
environment for an extended-period hydraulic and quality simulation of WDSs within 
pressurized pipe networks. The contaminant and dye transport in the network is modeled 
here as a perfect tracer, meaning the model does not account for decay, density effects, 
and reaction with wall materials and other dissolved species. 
 
5.3 Dynamic Evolutionary Optimization 
Emergency response decisions of hydrant operation and food-grade dye injection 
should be optimized for effective mitigation of the public health risks. The health 
impacts are expressed here mathematically as the ultimate total ingested mass (TIM) of 
contaminant by all consumers during the course of a contamination incident: 
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where CN = number of consumers, IN = number of water ingestion events for each 
consumer,  jiV , = volume of water ingested by consumer j  at ingestion event i , and jiC ,
= concentration of contaminant in water volume ingested by consumer j  at ingestion 
event i . Considering multiple sources of uncertainty and variability described in the 
previous section, Eq. (5.1), which indicates the predicted value of ultimate health 
impacts at every stage of the emergency, represents a time-varying function. Static 
optimization algorithms are insufficient for dealing with such changing objective 
functions. They need to be modified to adapt rapidly to changes in environment for 
generation of effective response plans at every phase of the emergency. Obviously, the 
simplest approach to respond to a change in the environment is to consider each change 
as the emergence of a new optimization problem that needs be solved from scratch. 
Given sufficient time, this is obviously a feasible approach. However, the time available 
for re-optimization is normally short during an emergency. Moreover, this approach 
presumes that a change in the environment can be identified, which is not always true. 
Dynamic optimization techniques systematically reuse information from previously 
explored environments to accelerate optimization process in emerging environments. 
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) resemble natural biological evolution, and since 
evolution is a continuous adaptation process in nature, they are promising candidates for 
tackling dynamic optimization problems (Jin and Branke 2005). To solve dynamic 
optimization problems, static EAs should be modified to adapt and recover from the 
changes during the evolution process. Major modifications in the static EAs are 
necessary for a timely adaptation to the changing environment to balance between 
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convergence and exploration. Compared to static EAs, higher emphasis should be placed 
on exploration after a change occurs, so that the algorithm can react rapidly to the 
change and track the moving optimum. Different methods have been proposed to deal 
with this issue, which can be classified into four groups (Jin and Branke 2005; Bui et al. 
in press): 
1) Boost diversity after a change: the EA is initially run in standard fashion. As 
soon as a change in the environment is identified, explicit strategies are implemented to 
generate diversity in the population. A common technique is hypermutation (Cobb 
1990), where the mutation rate is significantly increased for a limited number of 
generations after the change event is detected and then decreased over time. A very high 
mutation rate essentially results in a re-initialization of the population, whereas a low 
mutation rate does not boost sufficient diversity of the population. The difficult task of 
tuning the mutation rate changes is the major drawback of this approach.  
2) Maintain diversity throughout the run: convergence is limited through 
constant diversification hoping that a diverse population is more promising to adapt to 
time-varying changes. Random immigrants method (Grefenstette 1992), where new 
individuals are regularly introduced into the population, thermodynamic genetic 
algorithm (Mori et al. 1997), where the original objective function is replaced with an 
entropy-based value, and multiobjective-based method (Bui et al. 2005), where an 
artificial objective is used to promote diversity, are representatives of this approach. 
3) Memorize good solutions: the algorithm retains good solutions from past 
generations. This strategy provides diversity and helps the algorithm retrieve the 
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optimum in repetitive environments. Diploidy approach (Goldberg and Smith 1987), 
where redundant representations are used to generate solutions, is a popular instance of 
memory-based approaches.  
4) Use multiple subpopulations: the population is clustered into multiple 
subpopulations that evolve together to explore multiple promising regions of the 
decision making space. Some representative methods are multinational GA (Ursem 
2000), self-organizing scouts (Branke et al. 2000), and the shifting balance approach 
(Wineberg and Oppacher 2000). 
This study employs the multiobjective-based diversity preservation approach, 
which has been demonstrated as a robust and efficient method by previous research 
(Toffolo and Benini 2003; Bui et al. 2008). The main advantage of this technique is that 
it eliminates the need for defining a priori the proper diversity preservation parameter. 
The proper balance between convergence and exploration is systematically preserved 
during the process through treating diversity as a secondary (artificial) objective, which 
is optimized simultaneously with the main (true) optimization objective, as 
schematically illustrated in Fig. 5.1.  
Without the loss of generality, this chapter considers only the minimization of 
health impacts as the single true objective function among all objective functions that 
were considered in the previous chapters. The multiobjective-based diversity 
preservation approach used here “multiobjectivizes” (Handl et al. 2008) this classic 
single-objective optimization problem to a bi-objective optimization problem. Health 
impacts are minimized simultaneously with maximizing the artificial objective function 
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of diversity hoping added diversity to the GA population helps tracking the changing 
optimum in the dynamic environment. Once the multiobjectivization is performed, any 
traditional multiobjective optimization algorithm may be used to solve the constructed 
bi-objective optimization problem. 
The artificial diversity-preservation metric may be mathematically expressed in 
different ways. The three following formulations are examined here: 
1) Distance from the nearest neighbor (DNN): The artificial objective for a solution ix  is 
defined as the distance from ix  to its nearest neighbor. Therefore, a pair of very similar 
 
Fig. 5.1. Diversification of GA solutions in multiobjective-based dynamic 
optimization approach for methodological balance between exploitation and 
exploration in search process (filled circles represent Pareto-optimal solutions) 
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individuals will have a relatively poor artificial objective value, and thus the diversity in 
population is encouraged over the search space. 
 
ijNjxxdxDNN pjii  ,...,1),,(min)(  (5.2)
 
where pN  is the population size. 
2) Distance from the best solution of the population (DBS): The diversity metric is 
expressed as the distance from ix  to the current best solution in the population bestx  (with 
respect to the true objective function) to avoid any likely trap caused by local optima. 
 
),()( bestii xxdxDBS   (5.3)
 
3) Average distance from all solutions (ADS): Diversity is quantified as the average 
distance of ix  to all other individuals in the population. This formulation prefers 
solutions at the edge of population to boost the spread of the population. 
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The bi-objective optimization problem defined by Eq. (5.1) and any of Eqs. 
(5.2)-(5.4) may be solved using any classic multiobjective optimization algorithm. Non-
dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) is among the most 
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popular algorithms for solving both classic multiobjective water resources problems and 
emergent dynamic optimization problems. The algorithm applied in this study uses 
simulated binary crossover (Deb and Agrawal 1995), and polynomial mutation (Deb 
2001) for reproduction of offspring (contaminant flushing and dye injection locations). 
To explore new locations, reproduction operation is performed on coordinates of the 
parent solutions and the closest intermediate node in the WDS is chosen as an offspring 
solution. 
 
5.4 Application 
The virtual city of Mesopolis is used to demonstrate optimization of dye injection 
using the proposed framework. One contamination scenario is selected for optimization 
of hydrant opening and dye injecting alerting mechanisms. For this scenario, aggregate 
demand multiplier is 1.00 and 300 kg of arsenic is inserted into intermediate node 
IN0655 that is located in the vicinity of the East WTP. Injection starts at clock time 
00:00 over a period of 3 hours. The simulation duration is 24 hours and the dynamic 
optimization model run starts after a 6-hour response delay after the injection starts, i.e. 
06:00. The ultimate TIM is 146.2 grams if the managers take no action and consumers 
continue drinking after their ingested mass of arsenic exceeds the toxic dose of 3.5 mg 
and they observe the symptoms. If consumers change their water use behavior once they 
have received a toxic dose, the ultimate TIM is reduced to a smaller value of 138.0 
grams.  
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To analyze effect of changes in perceived source attributes, it is assumed that 
contaminant location and injection duration are first wrongly perceived to be the East 
WTP and 5 hours, respectively. Perceived ultimate TIM for this wrong estimation of true 
scenario attributes is 220.0 grams when no action is taken by the managers and 
consumers. If action is taken by the consumers, this is reduced to 211.8 grams. It is 
presumed that this wrongly perceived scenario is updated to the true scenario at time 
09:00 in the model.  
The number of hydrants and dye injectors are each set to 3. Hydrants are opened 
for 5 hours when used for flushing. The amount of dye injected per each injector is set to 
100 kg and the injection duration is 1 hour. The NSGA-II population size is set to 50 and 
the model is run until clock time 18:00. Crossover and mutation rates are 0.85 and 0.04, 
and SBX crossover distribution and polynomial mutation indices are set to 15 and 10, 
respectively. The optimization is run 5 times for every optimization case. 
Analysis is first performed to identify the best diversity measure among the three 
measures of DNN, DBS, and ADS. Both response strategies of hydrant operation and 
dye injection are used in this analysis. Changes in consumers’ water use and perceived 
scenario attributes are not considered for this analysis. Fig. 5.2 indicates the time series 
of the mitigated ultimate TIM corresponding to the best solution at every time step. The 
area confined by the time series curve and the horizontal axis provides a numeric value 
for the comparison of effectiveness of different measures: a smaller area corresponds to 
a more efficient measure. This area is 2,182.9, 2,201.2, and 2,143.4 for ADS, DBS, and 
DNN, respectively. Conclusively, through quantitative and visual comparison, DNN 
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outperforms ADS and DBS and is selected as the more efficient diversity measure and 
used for the later analyses in this chapter. 
After the dynamic optimization model is run, the quality of optimal solutions 
suggested by the model changes over time. Longer time allows the model to better 
explore the search domain and converge to better solutions. This extended delay, 
however, reduces the effectiveness of solutions because of the prolonged exposure of the 
public to the contaminant and wider spread of the contamination. Fig. 5.3 shows the time 
series for minimum-TIM solution offered by the optimization model using hydrant 
operation, dye injection, or both strategies. The mitigated health impacts reduce during 
the first hour and generally increases afterwards for all three cases. Considering the 
simulation-optimization setting described above, visual inspection shows dye injection 
 
Fig. 5.2. Time series of minimum ultimate TIM obtained using different diversity 
measures for the perceived scenario attributes 
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outperforms hydrant operation, and best performance is achieved when both strategies 
are implemented, that is not surprising. The area measure is 2261.2, 2180.6, and 2,143.4 
for time series corresponding to hydrant operation, dye injection, and both strategies, 
which quantitatively confirms the visual comparison findings. After about 14 hours, 
nevertheless, the effectiveness of all three response cases becomes practically similar 
due to the significantly long response delay. 
Besides the response delay, the effectiveness of emergency response actions 
taken at every time step depends on the previous response strategies executed by the 
emergency managers and the changes in perceived scenario attributes identified by the 
stream of new information that becomes available. Fig. 5.4 shows how the time series 
for minimum ultimate TIM changes when these factors are taken into account. Time 
 
Fig. 5.3. Time series of minimum TIM obtained using strategies of hydrant 
operation, dye injection, or both, for the perceived scenario attributes 
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series associated with these changes shown in Fig. 5.4 indicate that the minimum 
ultimate TIM drops suddenly after the scenario is updated, which can be attributed to the 
smaller exposure zone associated with the intermediate node than the East WTP.  
Moreover, it is presumed that the managers execute the minimum-TIM response 
plan recommended by the model at clock time 11:00. This change is manifested by a 
drop in TIM in Fig. 5.4. The model considers effect of this executed action when 
evaluating later actions. It is generally observed that the originally increasing trend of 
Fig. 5.4. Time series of minimum TIM considering the effects of managers’ actions 
(best plan is executed at 11:00), perceived scenario changes (scenario is updated at 
09:00), and consumers’ water use behavior changes 
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the time series changes to a decreasing pattern after the response execution time. This 
implies the increased quality of solutions due to the more convergence surpass the 
degradation in solutions performance due to the longer response delay. 
Fig. 5.4 also illustrates the minimum-TIM time series when the changes in 
consumers’ water use behavior is also taken into account. The general pattern of this 
time series is noticeably similar to the case in which only the scenario changes and 
managers’ response is considered. However, the ultimate TIM is consistently lower, 
which can be attributed to the fact that health impacts is smaller when the consumers 
stop drinking contaminated water after they ingest a mass of contaminant above the toxic 
dose. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
Dynamic simulation of emergency conditions provides a more realistic picture of 
the complex process than static models through considering uncertainties and changes 
that alter system normal operation after contamination starts. Dynamic optimization 
provides timely and realistic emergency response recommendations through adapting the 
response to the varying behavior of the system and finding the best balance between 
exploitation of old search domain information and exploration of emerging search space. 
A multi-objective-based dynamic optimization algorithm was used in this study 
that defines and maximizes an artificial objective function for preserving diversity 
among solutions. Among three different diversity preservation measures of distance 
from the nearest neighbor, distance from the best solution of the population, and average 
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distance from all solutions, distance from the nearest neighbor turned out to be the best 
metric.  
The model employed in this study for the simulation of WDS-consumers 
interactions and dynamics was very simple. Use of a more advanced sociotechnical 
model that accounts for the communication of human agents and mobility would better 
capture real system behavior and is recommended for future research. However, use of 
more complicated models should not significantly increase the computational burden of 
every simulation since the dynamic optimization model needs to be run in a real-time 
manner during the emergency. 
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6. MACHINE LEARNING FOR REAL-TIME CONTAMINANT SOURCE 
IDENTIFICATION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Water contamination source identification involves the characterization of the 
contamination event attributes using threat observations such as sensor network 
measurements. Effectiveness of emergency response decisions for the mitigation of 
contamination impacts significantly depends on managers’ knowledge of these source 
characteristics. This knowledge may be enhanced through analyzing measured 
contaminant concentration time series data using an inverse modeling approach. 
Once the contamination source has been identified, a response generation model 
must be employed to characterize response strategies for the mitigation of impacts. 
Ideally, the response generation model should be able to generate optimal strategies in 
real-time. The optimization approach proposed in previous chapters performs well in 
identifying optimal or near-optimal strategies. This, however, comes at a price, which is 
computation run time. The optimization model starts from a random set of solutions and 
increases the quality of solutions through evolution over time. Effectiveness and 
timeliness of such models may be significantly improved when they are supplemented 
with a group of good solutions to start the evolution process instead of using completely 
random solutions. Data mining may be employed to extract knowledge on good 
solutions during the emergency from the information database developed during the 
emergency preparedness phase (i.e., well before an actual emergency begins). Such 
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identified good solutions may be either used to boost the evolution process or be 
executed independently without performing optimization during an emergency. 
The rest of this chapter describes the application of data mining for real-time 
characterization of contaminant sources and emergency response strategies in two 
separate sections. The first section is dedicated to real-time contaminant source 
characterization. The second section describes the schemes developed for real-time 
emergency response. Each section covers the description of past works and 
methodologies proposed in this dissertation, as well as demonstration and discussion of 
proposed models on the Mesopolis virtual city WDS. 
 
6.2 Classification Approach for Source Identification 
6.2.1 Literature Review and Statement of the Work 
Probabilistic approaches have been explored by several researchers to 
characterize contaminant sources in WDSs. These approaches are mostly based upon 
Bayes’ theorem to estimate likelihood of possible contamination sources. Dawsey et al. 
(2006) employed a Bayesian belief networks methodology to integrate sensor data with 
other validating evidence of contamination events to better characterize sources and 
reduce false positives. De Sanctis et al. (2008) studied the impact of imperfect sensor 
measurements on contamination source characterization using a backtracking algorithm. 
Propato et al. (2010) proposed an entropic-based Bayesian inversion technique, the 
minimum relative entropy method, to estimate contaminant source probabilities. Wang 
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and Harrison (in press) implemented a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm based on 
Bayesian analysis for probabilistic source characterization.  
Optimization approaches have also been broadly employed to deal with the 
problem of contaminant source characterization. The source characteristics such as 
intrusion location and duration are treated as decision variables and the objective is to 
minimize the difference between observed and simulated concentrations. Laird et al. 
(2005) employed nonlinear programming to estimate the time and location of 
contamination source. Guan et al. (2006) demonstrated a simulation-optimization model 
by coupling a WDS simulation model with a gradient-based local search. Evolutionary 
computation-based optimization algorithms such as evolution strategies have been 
investigated to solve the source identification problem and address non-uniqueness of 
contaminant sources (Zechman and Ranjithan 2009; Liu et al. 2011; Drake and Zechman 
2011). Overall, optimization techniques have been demonstrated to accurately determine 
contaminant sources and can be also modified for adaptive monitoring (Liu et al. 2011). 
However, these methods are inherently computationally intensive, which is a critical 
issue considering the very important role of prompt response for mitigation of public 
health consequences. 
The approach presented in this study has the following steps. First, considering 
the uncertainties in different system parameters, a reasonably large set of realizations is 
simulated for a bounded set of contamination scenario possibilities, and sensor readings 
time series are recorded for each realization. Since the contamination scenario is known 
for each realization-sensor reading dataset, this constitutes a large database of 
 103
“classified” and “labeled” sensor readings time series (these terms are further defined in 
section 6.2.2). In application, this phase of generating the time series dataset is 
performed during the emergency preparedness phase. Once an actual contamination 
incident occurs, a time series of contaminant concentration is recorded that is used to 
estimate the unknown contamination scenario; since the real attributes of the 
contamination scenario are not definitively known, the sensed time series is referred to 
as “unlabeled” and “unclassified.” The task of classification of unlabeled time series – 
which can be also interpreted as an inverse problem – will be accomplished here with a 
data mining technique and pattern matching scheme.  The pattern matching framework 
uses similarity search to compare the unlabeled times series with the labeled ones that 
exist in the dataset. Two similarity measures of Euclidean distance and correlation 
metric are used here. The k-nearest neighbors (kNN) classification algorithm (Cover and 
Hart 1967) is also used for data mining in this study. 
 
6.2.2 Probabilistic Analysis 
Uncertainties are unavoidable in design and operation of engineering systems. 
The randomness in sensor data measurements stems from various uncertainties. These 
uncertainties are beyond the control of WDS designers and operators. They essentially 
arise from our inability to predict the accurate consequence of a process due its random 
nature, lack of complete information, or both. Consideration of these uncertainties is a 
crucial task in the characterization of contaminant sources. 
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Ang and Tang (2007) distinguished two broad types of uncertainties: (1) 
uncertainty associated with natural randomness of the underlying phenomenon (e.g., 
natural variability of water demands); and (2) uncertainty associated with imprecision in 
our prediction of reality (e.g., uncertainty in estimation of pipes roughness coefficient in 
design phase). The former is called aleatory uncertainty, while the latter is known as 
epistemic uncertainty. 
Khanal et al. (2006) categorized the sources of uncertainty in a WDS 
contamination event in a different way. They categorized them into static and dynamic 
parameters. Static parameters are characteristics of the WDS that are not influenced by 
human behavior, such as pipe diameter. Dynamic variables, on the other hand, are 
properties of the system that are affected by the behavior of consumers and utility 
operators, such as demand patterns. Khanal et al. (2006) considered the uncertainties in 
demand pattern, tank storage, contamination duration, and contaminant mass in 
probabilistic impact assessment of contamination events. Pasha and Lansey (2010) also 
included the uncertainties in decay coefficients, pipe diameter and roughness, and nodal 
demands in such assessments. 
For a deterministic model, every contamination event is associated with only one 
time series of measurements by a given sensor. However, in reality there exist multiple 
possible time series at this sensor for a specific contamination event due to the 
probabilistic behavior of the system. Uncertainties in static and dynamic WDS variables 
may be propagated through Monte Carlo analysis to determine the uncertainties in 
sensor network measurements. Fig. 6.1 illustrates four different sensor reading time 
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series associated with two potential contamination scenarios for WDS of Mesopolis. 
Each of the time series correspond to one realization of the event under uncertainties in 
demands, pipe diameter and roughness, and tank water level. As observed, while the 
time series for different realizations for each specific event do not completely match, a 
common pattern may still be distinguished. The set of realizations for one scenario is 
called a class and the label of this class is the corresponding scenario. 
 
 
Fig. 6.1. Sensor reading time series for multiple realizations for two contamination 
scenarios under different parameter uncertainties 
 
6.2.3 Classification of Time Series 
6.2.3.1 Similarity Measures 
One of the simplest similarity measures for comparing time series is the 
Euclidean distance metric. Assume that two time sequences r and s are of the same 
length n. We can find the Euclidean dissimilarity measure using the familiar formula: 
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where superscript T denotes the transpose of a vector. Correlation distance may be also 
used for determining the level of similarity between two time series. This distance is 
defined as one minus the sample correlation between points (treated as sequence of 
values), or mathematically: 
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where r  and s  are the mean values of corresponding time series.  
 
6.2.3.2 Classification Algorithm 
Given an unlabeled time series and a pool of labeled time series, different 
classification algorithms (classifiers) may be used to label the unlabeled time series. The 
k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classifier (Cover and Hart 1967) is used here for this purpose. 
kNN classifies unlabeled instances based on a “voting” of the labels of k closest training 
samples in the feature space. In the context of this particular study, given a fixed value 
of k, the k nearest labeled time series to the unlabeled new time series are first identified 
using any of the similarity measures mentioned above. The label (scenario) that is most 
frequent in this set of neighbors is selected as the scenario that has generated the 
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unlabeled time series. Since the size of neighborhood directly influences the final 
classification decision, analysis should be performed using different values of k for a 
training and test set to determine the optimal k value. 
kNN is a lazy learning algorithm (also known as the memory-based algorithms) 
since it defers dataset processing until a classification request arises. Because kNN uses 
local information, it can achieve highly adaptive performance. On the other hand, kNN 
involves a large storage requirement, and the value of k also needs to be determined 
properly. Alternative classification algorithms such as quadratic classifier, Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANN), and Support Vectors Machines (SVM) may be investigated for 
dealing with these difficulties (Bishop 2006). 
 
6.2.4 Application 
A sensor network needs to be first designed to collect the time series for different 
contamination scenarios. There exist many sensor placement strategies that can be used 
for this purpose. A comprehensive list of such methods may be found in a review 
conducted by Hart and Murray (2010). Since this design task is not the focus of the 
source characterization scheme presented in this chapter, a set of 11 intuitive places are 
selected to place the sensors (Fig. 6.2.). It is believed, however, that using a 
methodically designed sensor network would enhance the information content and 
quality of recorded time series, which accordingly improves performance of the source 
identification model. Future work will employ a well-demonstrated algorithm to design 
the sensor network for Mesopolis for this purpose.  
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In this application example, the region of nodes in which the contaminant is 
injected is highlighted by a rectangular zone in Fig. 6.2. Without the loss of generality, 
only the contaminant injection location is considered as the attribute that varies over 
different scenarios. Since the region includes 341 nodes, 341 different scenarios exist 
that thus define 341 classes. The injected contaminant mass is 100 kg and the injection 
start-time and duration are 20:00 and 3 hours, respectively. Global demand multiplier is 
set to the average value of 1.00. The simulation is performed for 68 hours, and the 
sensors’ readings are recorded at every one-hour time step after the injection starts. 
Therefore, the length of time series for each single sensor is 48. As the sensor network 
includes 11 sensors, the total number of sensor reading values is 528 for every scenario 
(class) of contaminant injection location. 
The uncertainty in system parameters is succinctly expressed by its coefficient of 
variation (COV), which is defined as a parameter’s standard deviation divided by its 
Fig. 6.2. Sensor network and the zone of contaminant injection 
 
Diameter
10.00
14.00
24.00
36.00
in
Diamet r (in)
10
14
24
36 Sensor Location
Contaminant Injection Zone
 109
mean. In this study, COV is set to a relatively high value of 0.1 for nodal demands, pipe 
diameter, pipe roughness, and tank water level. A COV of 0.05 is assumed for aggregate 
system demand. A normal distribution is assumed for all uncertain parameters. Twenty 
realizations are performed for each injection location. The total size of the contamination 
event dataset is 6,820, equal to the number of contamination scenarios multiplied by the 
number of realizations.  
Performance of classification algorithms is commonly evaluated based upon the 
rate of correct classification of samples in a test set using the training set. Classification 
rate is defined as the number of correctly classified test samples over the total number of 
samples in the test set. In the context of this example application, correct classification 
means the injection location is identified correctly by the kNN algorithm. In this study, 
80% of the data is randomly selected for training, and the rest is used for testing. A 
relaxed metric is also defined that assumes classification is correct if the model suggests 
either the true injection location or its immediate neighbors for a test sample. 
Fig. 6.3 shows the classification rates using Euclidian and correlation similarity 
measures for varying neighborhood size k. Since the randomness in dividing the dataset 
into training and test sets influences the classification rate, the kNN algorithm is run 5 
times for each value of k, and the minimum, mean, maximum rates are reported. The 
results show that the classification is performed better when the Euclidean similarity 
measure is used. It is also observed that highest classification rate is achieved for k = 1. 
This result may be due to the fact that the number of realizations for each scenario 
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(class) is significantly lower than the total number of classes. Further analyses using 
more realizations for each scenario are needed to check this hypothesis.   
  
 
 
 
Fig. 6.3. Classification performance for different similarity measures and varying 
k values 
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Fig. 6.3. Continued 
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contamination source is used as input information to the real-time response 
characterization model. 
Considering the very large number of possible contamination scenarios and the 
computational cost of response optimization, preparation of optimal response plans for 
all possible scenarios during the emergency management preparedness phase is very 
difficult, if not impossible. A potential approach to limit the number of optimization runs 
is to discover groups of similar contamination scenarios and find optimal response plans 
only for representatives of these groups. This process of discovering a number of groups 
within a dataset examples is called clustering. In contrast to classification, clustering is 
an unsupervised learning process meaning it does not use or require labels of data 
samples for learning. In the context of contamination scenario clustering, for instance, 
scenarios do not have any labels attached to them to supervise the learning process. The 
task of clustering scenarios has three initial requirements: 1) defining a characteristic for 
comparing different scenarios, 2) defining a similarity measure to determine how similar 
scenarios are using the defined characteristic, 3) structuring a clustering algorithm. 
 
6.3.1 Scenario Characteristic and Similarity Measures  
Comparing two different scenarios may be most simply based upon the sum 
value of differences between each pair of their corresponding attributes. However, it is 
not feasible to effectively integrate the differences between each pair of attributes to 
construct a single comparison metric because the attributes are inherently of different 
natures (e.g., contamination location vs. injection duration).  
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An alternative approach is to define a comparison characteristic. In the context of 
emergency response planning for the mitigation health impacts, the spatial distribution 
of health impacts associated with every scenario can be used to define this characteristic. 
The underlying assumption here is that a specific response plan that performs well for 
Scenario X would also perform reasonably well for Scenario Y if the distributions of 
health impacts for both scenarios are convincingly similar. Mathematically, this 
characteristic is defined here as a vector of ultimate total injected mass of contaminant 
(TIM) for every node in the network with non-zero population. Extended hydraulic and 
exposure simulation needs to be performed for every scenario to construct its impact 
vector. Fig. 6.4 shows impact vectors for two potential contamination scenarios in 
Mesopolis. 
 
 
Fig. 6.4. Health impact vector associated with two potential contamination scenarios in 
Mesopolis 
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characteristic. Euclidean and correlation measures are used for this purpose. These 
measures are calculated using Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2).  
 
6.3.2 Clustering Algorithm  
The K-means algorithm (Lioyd 1982) is used in this study for clustering 
contamination scenarios. Intuitively, we may think of a cluster as comprising a set of 
data samples whose inter-point distances are small compared with the distances to 
samples outside of the cluster. In the K-means algorithm, this intuitive notion is 
formalized through introducing a set of vectors k , where k  = 1, …, K , in which k  is a 
prototype (representative) corresponding to the thk  cluster k . Length of k  is equal to 
the length of the impact vector, which is the number of non-zero population nodes.  
K-means is a clustering procedure that attempts to minimize a criterion function 
J , which is usually called the distortion function, that is defined as  
 
    Ki wx ii xdJ 1 )(   (6.3)
 
where )( kxd  is the distance (dissimilarity) between data sample x  and the mean 
vector and is given by any of Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2). Distortion function basically sums up 
the distances from each data sample x  to the mean vector k  of the cluster that it is 
assigned to.  
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The goal in K-means algorithm is assigning data samples to K clusters so that the 
distortion function is minimized. This is commonly achieved through an iterative 
process that reassigns each sample to its nearest cluster (represented by its mean vector 
k ) at every iteration. Some degree of controlled randomness may be introduced during 
the assignment process to reduce the possibility of premature convergence to local 
minima.  
 
6.3.3 Application 
A dataset of contamination scenarios first needs to be prepared. While the 
presented approach can be generally applied with consideration of all scenario attributes, 
the illustrative study here is limited to the single attribute of contaminant injection node 
setting other attributes to fixed values. Contaminant mass and global demand multiplier 
are set to 100 kg and 1.00, respectively. The simulation duration is 1 day and the 
contamination starts at 06:00 with a duration of 1 hour. The length of impact vectors is 
428 and total number of data samples is 881. After removing injection locations that do 
not contaminate any non-zero-population node, this dataset size is reduced to 636. To 
enhance the clustering performance, impact vectors are normalized so that the ultimate 
TIM for every node in the vector is between 0 and 1. 
Since K-means algorithm is an iterative process and starts from randomly 
assigned samples, multiple model runs are required to assure a more robust performance. 
The number of iterations and model runs is set here to 1000 and 10, respectively. A 
controlled random assignment is introduced with a variable probability of 0.1 linearly 
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decreasing to 0 at the end of each model run. This is principally performed to escape 
from local minima in the search space. Fig. 6.5 shows the clustering results for K values 
of 14 and 21 using Euclidean and correlation similarity measures.  
 
 
Fig. 6.5. Clustering of scenarios using different K values and similarity measures 
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Fig. 6.5. Continued 
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Fig. 6.5. Continued 
 
Using a previous knowledge on network hydraulics, the results show that the 
correlation measure is a significantly more informative measure for comparing similarity 
and clustering the scenarios. Clusters obtained using this measure well capture 
hydraulics of the system, including the discontinuities, pressure zones, and flow patterns. 
For instance, for K = 21, this is manifested by generating clusters in isolated regions 
such as eastern and western peninsulas, and pressure zones such as the clusters 
illustrated with empty red and blue diamonds.  
Fig. 6.5 generally shows that the use of Euclidean measure results in some very 
large clusters in contrast to the correlation metric. This information is quantitatively 
illustrated in Fig. 6.6 using pie charts. While it is not necessarily better that all clusters 
Correlation - K = 21
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have the same size, assigning a high percentage of scenarios to a few clusters is not 
interpreted as an efficient clustering practice for the WDS of Mesopolis since this 
network is highly complex and includes several pressure zones and isolated regions. To 
deal with the issue of having too small or too large clusters, more advanced clustering 
method of Iterative Self-Organizing Data Analysis (ISODATA) (Ball and Hall, 1965) 
may be also used that automatically merges very small clusters and splits very large 
clusters.  
A next phase of analysis in now performed for methodological demonstration of 
the effectiveness of scenario clustering for real-time response. The objective of this 
phase is to compare the accurate but slow optimization method proposed in previous 
chapters with approximate but real-time machine learning approach presented here. 
First, optimization is performed for all scenarios in a cluster k  and corresponding 
minimum health impact values are determined. Second, the representative scenario for 
   
Fig. 6.6. Size of clusters obtained using different similarity measures 
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that cluster is determined, which is the scenario that is most similar to the mean vector 
k . Third, simulations are performed to calculate health impact values for all scenarios 
in the cluster when the optimal response plan for the representative scenario is executed. 
The machine learning approach is most efficient when these impact values are equal to 
the corresponding minimum values obtained in the first step. 
The analysis is performed for three clusters obtained when correlation similarity 
measure is used and K = 21. These three clusters are called A, B, and C, and are 
illustrated in Fig. 6.7, which also shows the identified representatives of every cluster 
with a filled square. The number of scenarios in these clusters is 47, 54, and 30, 
respectively, and Cluster B is the largest cluster among all 21 clusters. Representatives 
of clusters A, and B are found to be West and East WTP, respectively. This analytical 
finding is in agreement with subjective judgment as these two clusters are right 
downstream of the two WTPs. For the representative for Cluster C, however, no specific 
comment may be made about where the representative scenario can be since all scenario 
injection locations are normal intermediate nodes located in central zone of the WDS, 
where the hydraulics and dynamics of the system is complex and very difficult interpret.  
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Two response strategies of hydrant opening and food-grade dye injection are 
considered. The number of hydrants and dye injectors are 5 and 3, respectively, and the 
response delay (time period after contaminant insertion is completed) is set to 2 hours. 
The characteristics of the optimization algorithm are described in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Genetic algorithm optimization model is run 1 time for every scenario in every cluster. 
Multiple runs per scenario, however, would provide a better estimation of the global 
optimum.  
Fig. 6.8 shows the values of ultimate total ingested mass for scenarios in Cluster 
A for three situations: 1) no response is executed, 2) optimal response plan for every 
 
Fig. 6.7. Clusters A, B, and C (circles), and corresponding representative scenarios 
(squares) 
 
Cluster A
Cluster B
Cluster C
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scenario is implemented, and 3) representative response plan is executed for every 
scenario in the cluster. Scenarios are sorted according to their no-response TIM to 
facilitate visual comparison. Horizontal axis, thus, conveys no particular information. 
Results indicate that optimal dye injection outperforms optimal hydrant operation for the 
mitigation of impacts although the number of dye injection locations is less than 
contaminant flushing locations. For both response strategies, it is observed that using 
representative plan can well mitigate the impacts for several scenarios in the cluster. For 
certain scenarios, it is observed that reduction in TIM is higher when representative plan 
is used than the determined optimal plan. This shows more than 1 optimization run is 
required for these scenarios to better estimate the global optimum.  
Since dye injection was found to be more effective than hydrant operation, only 
this strategy is used for Clusters B and C. Results for these two clusters are indicated in 
Fig. 6.9. These results further demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed machine 
learning approach for real-time response to contamination events.  
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Fig. 6.8. Health impacts for scenarios in Cluster A for different response situations 
using (a) hydrant opening and (b) food-grade dye injection 
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Fig. 6.9. Health impacts for scenarios in (a) Cluster B and (b) Cluster C for different 
response situations using food-grade dye injection 
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6.4 Conclusions 
kNN classification algorithm was applied for the characterization contaminant 
source in WDS under various uncertainties. Application of this approach during an 
emergency is simple, real-time, and considers the random behavior of the system 
manifested in sensor network readings. However, it requires a very large number of 
simulations to be performed during the preparedness phase. Between the two similarity 
measures of Euclidean and correlation distances, Euclidean measure was shown to have 
a better performance. 
K-means clustering algorithm was used to cluster contamination scenarios for 
real-time and reasonably effective contamination emergency response. Clustering was 
based upon similarity of scenarios regarding the corresponding distribution of health 
impacts. In contrast to the classification study, correlation similarity measure is more 
effective. More elaborate optimization runs may be performed for all clusters determined 
using different similarity measures and K values to more accurately evaluate 
performance of different combinations and tune model settings. 
Proposed machine learning schemes have also the potential to be used in 
conjunction with optimization approaches, which have higher accuracy but are 
significantly more computationally intensive, during the emergency. Machine learning 
models can provide the optimization models with a set of good solutions (contaminant 
source characteristics or response plans) to start the iterations or evolution process and, 
thus, expediting the convergence to global or near-optimal optimal solutions during an 
emergency.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation proposed and developed a comprehensive set of risk 
assessment, systems analysis, and machine learning methodologies and models to help 
the emergency managers with risk assessment, emergency preparation, and emergency 
response for WDS contamination events. This set of decision support schemes provides 
the mangers with valuable information on vulnerable aspects of the system and effective 
and timely strategies for achievement of different emergency management objectives. 
Proposed tools were discussed and demonstrated on a highly complex virtual WDS to 
assure their usefulness for real-world applications.  
The concept of maximum-risk frontier was proposed and demonstrated to be 
effective in dealing with principal risk measures of event likelihood and consequences 
for characterization of critical scenarios. A more comprehensive meta-analysis of 
historical events supplemented with epidemiological studies would enhance the accuracy 
of probability estimations. Consequences would be also more realistically estimated 
when sociotechnical modeling that simulates the human-infrastructure dynamics is 
performed. Research is currently underway to accomplish this more advanced modeling. 
 Multiobjective optimization was used for multicriteria emergency preparedness 
and response considering multiple strategies and objectives. Proposed schemes would be 
of significant help to emergency mangers to reach optimal trade-off between their 
conflicting objectives during the intense course of an emergency. Dynamic optimization 
models consistently adapt to the changing environment to provide the managers with up 
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to date support and information. A comprehensive decision support system may be 
developed in future that includes all response strategies and objectives in an integrated 
graphical user interface to facilitate communication between managers and the models. 
Machine learning approaches were proposed to provide the managers with timely 
information on contaminant sources and effective emergency response decisions. 
Simplicity and real-time performance of these methods, in particular, are believed to be 
their most valuable characteristics, while their accuracy are not claimed to be as high as 
the optimization approach. This kind of modeling is in its infancy and extensive future 
research is required to enhance their performance. This includes application of more 
advanced and efficient classification and clustering algorithms. Source identification and 
response recommendation schemes may also be integrated to facilitate their use and 
enhance their applicability. 
All in all, developed static optimization, dynamic optimization, and machine 
learning models are most useful when are used in an integrated manner. Static 
optimization is used before the contamination happens to develop a reasonably 
generalizable database of effective response plans. Real-time source characterization 
model is used after the emergency occurs to determine the contamination scenario. This 
scenario is given as an input to the real-time response model to estimate a reasonably 
effective response plan. This response plan is executed by the managers, either directly, 
or after some degree of improvisation based upon their subjective and qualitative 
judgments. Dynamic optimization scheme is informed by these actions and any future 
decisions to adapt to the new environment and provide up to date response support as the 
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emergency proceeds and emerging conditions deviate more form those predicted during 
the preparedness phase. All these different stages of modeling are believed to be fruitful 
areas for future research.  
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